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Constraining the Federal Trade
Commission: The Case of Occupational
Regulation
KENNETH W. CLARKSON* AND TIMOTHY J. MURIS**
Finding that much of state regulation of occupations re-
stricts entry into the market and thereby limits the choices
that consumers can make for themselves, the authors examine
FTC efforts to change this regulation. The authors consider the
Commission itself, the Congress, and the courts to analyze the
likely outcome of the FTC's efforts. Because the FTC has had a
long history of hostility toward market forces, the authors find
the agency likely to impose some new rules upon occupations.
After arguing that Congress' power to control FTC action is in-
effective, absent the rare situation of a hostile political envi-
ronment, the authors state that a "new administrative law" is
developing that provides increased judicial scrutiny of agency
rulemaking. This more stringent judicial review makes deregu-
lation easier because it facilitates removal of licensure pro-
grams and makes imposition of new regulation more difficult.
The authors urge that the courts end anti-consumer rulemak-
ing by requiring that the. benefits from actions mandated by
agency rules exceed their costs, thereby achieving the actual
goal of the FTC: bettering the welfare of the consumer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The division of the American government into three branches
constrains the power of each branch. In the twentieth century, ad-
ministrative agencies, in effect a fourth branch, have grown in
power. How effectively the other branches constrain these agencies
is one of the great issues of modern public policy. This article in-
vestigates the constraints on an administrative agency' by focusing
on the occupational licensure program of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC). We chose this focus because of its ability to test
the limits of FTC power. Historically, licensed occupations have
used powerful lobbies in state legislatures to ward off attacks and
to create new restrictions. Having asserted that it can preempt
state law, the Commission could reshape the legal environment af-
fecting licensed occupations. Whether the Commission will succeed
depends in significant part on how effectively the environment
within which the Commission operates constrains its choice of
programs.
Section II of this article provides the background for the theo-
retical underpinnings of the FTC's occupational regulatory effort
by briefly stating the economic case against occupational regula-
tion. Section III outlines the occupational licensure program of the
1. We emphasize the constraints created from within the Commission, from Congress,
and from the judiciary. We will treat the executive branch and nongovernmental constraints
more briefly within the context of the executive and judicial constraints. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the relationship between the FTC and the executive branch, see THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970; ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR (K.
Clarkson & T. Muris ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CLARKSON & MURis]. Chapter 15 elabo-
rates on the thrust of FTC action as a whole but does not dwell on specific programs such as
occupational licensure. See also note 3 infra.
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FTC. Sections IV through VI discuss three institutions-the Com-
mission itself, the Congress, and the judiciary-to determine the
likelihood of success of the occupational licensure program. Before
examining constraints from external sources, however, we deter-
mine whether the Commission will use its preempting power pri-
marily to deregulate existing state requirements or, instead, to im-
pose new federal regulations.s As for Congress, we analyze how
congressional opposition or support influences a particular agency
program-in this case, occupational licensure. These sections con-
clude by analyzing the important constraint of judicial review upon
agency action, assuming arguendo that the FTC can preempt rele-
vant state law.
II. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION
Occupational regulation can reduce the welfare of consumers
both ,by limiting entry into a particular business and by restricting
certain forms of competition (such as advertising and solicitation)
for those permitted to compete.3 The effects of regulation come in
many forms, including higher prices and restricted choice of goods.
Regulation reduces the welfare of consumers through the exclusion
or curtailment of lower-cost producers, such as paralegals in law,
nurses in medicine, dental hygienists in dentistry, and apprentices
in the electrical, plumbing, and other trades. Regulations that bar
technically qualified individuals from foreign countries from com-
peting in the United States because of non-participation in a certi-
fied educational training program in the United States represent
additional losses to consumer welfare. Occupational regulation also
limits the activities that already certified members may engage in,
again at a cost to consumers. For example, until recently most pro-
fessions prohibited advertising despite the fact that information
about the availability, product quality, and price of services is of
value to consumers.
In the past decade economists have produced considerable evi-
2. To simplify analysis, we define "deregulation" as the elimination of existing legal
requirements and "regulation" as the imposition of new legal requirements. Of course, not
all deregulation benefits consumers, nor does all regulation harm them. See, e.g., text ac-
companying note 16 infra.
3. See, e.g., E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS
OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1967); Benham, The Effects of Advertising on the
Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcON. 337 (1972); Benham & Benham, Regulating Through
the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421 (1975); Kessel,
The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 267 (1970); Shepard,
Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J.L. & ECON. 187 (1978).
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dence that occupational regulation often harms consumers. George
Stigler found that the median earnings of people engaged in li-
censed occupations were fifty percent greater than the median
earnings of those engaged in unlicensed occupations.4 Further, par-
tially licensed occupations had median earnings about fourteen
percent higher than unlicensed occupations.5 The Bureau of Eco-
nomics of the FTC found that television repair prices were higher
in areas with occupational licensure than in areas with mere regis-
tration systems or no regulation at all.' Lee Benham and John
Cady found that laws prohibiting advertising by sellers of eye-
glasses raised prices to consumers.7 In sum, the effects of some reg-
ulations are similar to those of successful cartelization.8 Unlike
strictly private cartels, however, which often do not have reliable.
methods of controlling competition, occupational regulation can ef-
fectively restrict competition through the power of the state. This
more powerful mechanism of enforcement makes the consequences
of occupational regulation potentially more adverse than those of
cartels. e
One argument often advanced to justify occupational regula-
tion that restricts competition is that it raises quality.10 Increased
quality, however, will not always justify such regulation. If a regu-
lation raises quality and prices, it may injure consumers because
the higher price may more than offset the benefit of increased
quality. In addition, a regulation that limits the range of quality
available to consumers will deny some consumers access to goods
or services that they would consider adequate given the lower price
that would exist without regulation. In any event, regulation does
not invariably raise quality. Over twenty years ago, Walter Gell-
4. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 3,
17 (1971).
5. Id. at 17.
6. Phelan, Regulation of Television Repair Industry in Louisiana and California: A
Case Study (FTC Bureau of Economics, 1975).
7. J. CADY, DRUGS ON THE MARKET: THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE RETAIL MAR-
KET FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (1975); Benham, supra note 3.
8. Plott, Occupational Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the Oklahoma Dry Cleaners,
8 J.L. & EcoN. 195, 221-22 (1965).
9. Private cartels are inherently unstable because of the ability of cartel members to
cheat. In occupational regulation, the power of the state supplies more effective monitoring
to prevent cheating.
10. See, e.g., Arrow, Uncertainty and the Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 966 (1963); Lerner, Licensure: Facing the Real Problem, 91 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N
742 (1975); Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services:
The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 179, 181-82 n.7.
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horn showed that increased occupational requirements do not nec-
essarily lead to increased quality." More recently, case studies
have indicated that some regulations may actually reduce quality.
For example, the FTC study of television repair found that fraud
through the unnecessary replacement of parts was higher with li-
censure than without licensure. ' In addition, a study of a legal
firm that advertised heavily found lower prices and, at least on
some services, significantly better quality."3
The relatively unregulated marketplace has significant advan-
tages in allocating resources and promoting consumer welfare.",
The market tends to minimize waste by permitting continuous in-
dividual balancing of economic costs and benefits by consumers
and producers. In addition, greater productive efficiency and more
innovation result from the reliance on market incentives. Competi-
tive markets also reduce the need for central collection of informa-
tion; their price signals allow producers and consumers to respond
quickly to change. Finally, competitive markets tend to decentral-
ize power and make decisions that are fair in the sense of being
impersonal. For these reasons, reliance on the market should be
the norm. The FTC has admitted as much:
The public policy of this country favors the existence of free
markets to the maximum extent possible. While the complexity
of the modern economy often necessitates a departure from free
market organization, as a general proposition a market-perfect-
ing solution to a perceived problem is preferable. There should
be a heavy burden of proof on those who would opt for a differ-
ent form of organization."
We do not assert that all government intervention in the mar-
ket is unjustified. The antitrust rules prohibiting price-fixing and
mergers leading to monopoly are among regulations widely be-
lieved to produce net benefits, as are rules against fraud and du-
ress. Further, the FTC television repair study found that random
government purchases of repair services to check for parts fraud
reduced such fraud." In general, the nature of government involve-
11. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956).
12. Phelan, supra note 6. This study compared the television repair industry in Louisi-
ana, which has licensure, to that in California, which does not have licensure.
13. Muris & McChesney, supra note 10.
14. See, e.g., Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Al-
ternatives, and Reform, 92 H~Av. L. REv. 549, 552-53 (1979).
15. 43 Fed. Reg. 24,001 (1978).
16. Phelan, supra note 6.
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ment in the production of goods and services is what separates
beneficial from harmful forms of regulation. Government involve-
ment designed to penalize prescribed behavior-for example, gov-
ernmental random tests, purchases defining property rights, and
other checks to penalize fraud-is likely to be beneficial. Govern-
ment involvement attempting to specify performance through con-
trol over specific components of the production process, such as
who can compete, usually increases the net costs of resource use
and hence is harmful.
In summary, economic analysis indicates that too much occu-
pational regulation exists. Occupational regulation decreases com-
petition and increases prices by limiting both entry and the terms
on which those who enter can compete. The sometimes dubious
claim of increased quality does not justify limiting the range of
quality and prices available to consumers. Given the problems that
occupational regulation causes, efforts to curtail it deserve encour-
agement. The sections that follow investigate one such effort, the
occupational licensure program of the FTC.
III. THE FTC's OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE PROGRAM
In early 1974, an intra-agency task force formed to develop
recommendations concerning the prescription drug market.
Headed by Wesley J. Liebeler, newly appointed director of the of-
fice of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, the task force reported
that the major problem at the retailing level was state prohibition
of advertising, which raised prices.17 The task force's recommenda-
tion that the Commission should preempt the offending state laws
led to the FTC's first foray into occupational regulation, the propo-
sal of a preemption rule in June of 1975.18
Following the Commission's warm reception of the drug report
in July of 1974, Liebeler proposed creation of a more general occu-
pational licensure program. The memorandum supporting this pro-
posal presented the economic case against occupational regulation
17. First Report of the Prescription Drug Task Force: Retailing (May 15, 1974). This
report led to PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DISCLOSURES, STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1975), which proposed trade regulation rules governing retail price disclosures
of prescription drugs.
18. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,031, 24,032 (1975). The trade regulation rule proposal would have
preempted state laws prohibiting advertisement of drug prices. The FTC abandoned the
proposed rule after a United States Supreme Court decision that protected drug advertising
under the first amendment of the United States Constitution. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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designed to control entry as well as various types of competition
such as advertising. In its deliberations concerning the fiscal year
1976 budget, conducted during the summer of 1974, the Commis-
sion approved the proposal. 9
The program lay dormant, however, until January 1975 when
Chairman Lewis Engman created a new task force. In a flurry of
activity, principally involving employees of the FTC's regional of-
fices, the Commission selected several industries for more detailed
investigation. Although many of these investigations have since
terminated, industries in which investigations continue include
those providing ophthalmologic, legal, dental, and real estate ser-
vices.20 Of these investigations, only the one involving optometrists
has produced action overturning occupational regulations, with the
promulgation in mid-1978 of a rule primarily preempting state
laws that forbade advertising of ophthalmic goods and services.2'
The Commission is also involved with regulation of the health
care and the funeral industries.2 The Commission began to con-
sider occupational regulation under the health care program in
1975, and has thus far produced cases or investigations against the
American Medical Association, the American Dental Association,
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, and other major entities involved in the
regulation of health care.'3 The Commission's funeral industry
rulemaking involves both industry self-regulation and government
regulation, including restraints on advertising.
The economic foundation of this attack on regulation-at least
those parts that have reached conclusion-is simple: Prohibiting
advertising raises prices. This conclusion and the resulting case
against state laws restricting advertising are products of the theo-
retical work of George Stigler and the empirical work of Lee Ben-
ham and others.'4 Remove the anti-competitive laws, the Commis-
sion apparently argues, and the market will work to lower prices.
Thus, the thrust of this part of the Commission's occupational li-
19. See 16 C.F.R. § 456 (1980).
20. FTC Budget Justification to Congress, Fiscal Year 1981, Occupational Licensing
Program. See FTC 1981 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the
Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980).
21. See 16 C.F.R. § 456 (1980); But see notes 188-90 and accompanying text infra.
22. See 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (1975) (Funeral Industry rulemaking).
23. See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 88 F.T.C. 955 (1976); Amer-
ican Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 88 F.T.C. 968 (1976); F.T.C. Budget Justifications
to Congress 1975-81.
24. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
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censure program is deregulatory, exuding considerable confidence
in the ability of the market to maximize consumer welfare.
The legal foundation of the program, however, is neither sim-
ple nor clearly sound, particularly on the issue whether the FTC
will eventually prevail in preempting state law. Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding the applicability of the Sherman Act to anti-com-
petitive activities authorized by state governments raise unresolved
questions concerning the Commission's power to preempt state law
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 5 A major issue is
whether the "state action" exemption to the Sherman Act outlined
in Parker v. Brown" will shield state occupational licensure pro-
grams from attack by the FTC.
Of the recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the scope of
the "state action" exemption to the Sherman Act,'7 Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona's is the most troubling for the Commission. In
Bates, the state bar charged two lawyers with violating the state
supreme court's disciplinary rules prohibiting media advertising.
Although the lawyers prevailed under a first amendment theory,
the court found that the Parker exemption precluded an antitrust
attack. Thus, this decision exempts from the Sherman Act a
clearly anti-competitive state law of the very kind targeted by the
FTC's occupational licensure program. Application of the Sherman
Act standard to the Federal Trade Commission Act would substan-
tially reduce the ability of the FTC to attack state occupational
regulation."
25. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-77 (West Supp. 1980).
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker concerned the validity of a state law enacted to main-
tain the price of raisins by restricting the supply that private growers could sell. Although
the scheme of the California law violated the principles of the Sherman Act, the Court re-
fused to apply the Act because "[tihe Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such,
and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state." 317 U.S. at 351.
27. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975).
28. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29. Of course, the FTC could still attack state regulation when the level of state action
was insufficient to invoke Parker. See P. ARE DA & D. TURNER, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 58-221
(1978). One commentator has suggested that a recent decision, City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), which refused to exempt local governments
under Parker, will "open up" occupational licensure to attack under the Sherman Act. Sims,
Antitrust Comes to City Hall, 3 REGULATION 35 (1979). If this is true, the FTC could strike
down occupational regulation, even if Sherman Act standards apply to the agency. Under
Lafayette, however, it appears easier to sue a locality than a licensing board, because the
latter could more successfully assert a state policy "to displace competition with regulation."
See 435 U.S. at 413 (Lafayette test for state action). In any event, the decision has added to
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Others have fully addressed elsewhere the issue of whether the
"state action" doctrine of Parker carries over to the Federal Trade
Commission Act,30 and therefore we will not discuss it in detail
here. Suffice it to say that the commentators and the FTC have
found strong support for the assertion of preemption power."1 The
FTC has shown confidence in this conclusion by making a commit-
ment, despite the legal uncertainty, of considerable funds to the
program, including nearly $1.5 million in fiscal year 1979 alone.3 2
Throughout the remainder of the paper we assume that the
FTC possesses the authority to preempt anti-competitive state
laws and regulations. This assumption will permit us to focus on
how the Commission itself, the Congress, and the courts might in-
fluence the results of FTC preemption efforts. An examination of
this influence will bring into serious question the wisdom of grant-
ing the FTC such a potent weapon. 8
IV. THE FUTURE WITHIN THE AGENCY
Despite large budget allocations, the FTC has obtained few re-
sults in the six years that it has been scrutinizing occupational reg-
ulations, except for the attack on advertising restrictions and some
progress in its health care program. The legal uncertainty of the
Commission's power to preempt seems unlikely to account for the
lack of progress, since other innovative Commission programs have
the already considerable confusion over the contours of the Parker exemption.
30. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Report of the State Regulation Task Force
(1978); Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 225; Note, The State Action Exception and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 89 HAJv. L. REv. 715 (1976). All three conclude that the agency can
preempt. But see Young and Troy, Federal Trade Commission Preemption of State Regu-
lation: A Reevaluation, 12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1248 (1978), arguing for a more limited preemp-
tion power. As these articles suggest, although with varying degrees of detail, it is not clear
that state action, which is an exemption, is directly relevant to the question of whether
Congress intended preemption.
31. The legislative history of Title II of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified in 15
U.S.C. §§ 45-52 (1976)), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702 (1974), may
provide evidence of Congressional intent to preempt. See generally Verkuil, supra note 30,
at 235-40.
32. See Budget of the Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 1979.
33. Regardless of the wisdom of Congress's action, if the Congress intended the FTC to
have preemptive power, the agency has the legal authority. If, however, Congressional intent
is unclear, a showing that the use of preemption power could be unwise might cause a court
to conclude that preemptive activities are unsupportable without a clearer Congressional
mandate.
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proceeded vigorously under similar legal uncertainty.3"
At least three additional reasons exist for the inactivity in the
occupational licensure program. First, throughout the history of
the program, the individuals ostensibly authorized to control the
program, or one of its parts, have sometimes lacked effective con-
trol of the resources assigned to the program. Second, considerable
potential opposition has existed. As we will see in Section V, how-
ever, this opposition has been largely ineffective. Third, and per-
haps most important, a fundamental inconsistency has persisted
between the program as originally conceived and many of the other
FTC activities that reflect the Commission's long history of skepti-
cism towards the unfettered market and the consumers who oper-
ate there. Rather than impose a "heavy burden of proof" in favor
of the market, as the agency itself has stated should be the case,85
the FTC has regulated on the slightest pretext. Illustrations of
such activity before 1970 include the FTC's heavy enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act, which penalizes large firms for their ef-
ficiency, and its advertising regulations, which assumed that many
consumers were incapable of making choices in a market without
substantial government assistance.3 6 The agency's denigrating view
of these consumers is at the heart of the defense for much occupa-
tional regulation. As one commentator described the FTC's view of
certain consumers:
General stupidity is not the only attribute of the beneficiary of
FTC policy. He also has a short attention span; he does not read
all that is to be read, but snatches general impressions. He signs
things he has not read, has marginal eyesight, and is frightened
by dunning letters when he has not paid bills. Most of all,
though, he is thoroughly avaricious."
As the FTC moved away from trivial cases in the 1970's to-
ward those with a potentially large impact, its preference for regu-
lation increased, particularly in the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, which supervises the occupational licensure program. The
Commission's proposed rules would substantially alter the existing
methods of doing business in many largely unregulated industries.
34. For example, the Commission vigorously pursued enforcement of its advertising
substantiation requirement for well over a year before it was given approval by the courts.
Further, the agency is attempting to deconcentrate certain industries despite a lack of clear
judicial support for the FTC's theory of liability.
35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. See CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note 1, at chs. 1, 6, 13.
37. G. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION 8 (1967).
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Several scholars have shown that many of these proposals appear
harmful to consumers as a class."8 For example, in attempting to
improve the quality of products, the agency has proposed rules
that would raise costs more than the corresponding benefits.3 " The
notion that consumers are often inept persists, particularly in pro-
posals to rewrite consumer contracts, which in part presuppose
that consumers will sign away rights without considering the con-
sequences.40 Finally, the proposals openly disregard the cost-bene-
fit trade-offs that occur in the market. For example, to justify part
of a proposed rule that would require credit contracts to eliminate
or restrict certain remedies that creditors now use, the FTC staff
argued that the agency should adopt the proposal "regardless of
cost considerations.
'4 1
The FTC's preference for regulation and its corresponding dis-
trust of the market affect the occupational licensure program in at
least two ways. First, these attitudes may in part explain the hesi-
tancy in attacking regulation. Most of the program to date has
dealt with advertising bans, now commonly accepted as anticompe-
titive. The Commission approaches other forms of occupational
regulation very cautiously, particularly restrictions on who can
compete, perhaps because proponents of these regulations often
justify them with the same health, quality, and paternalistic rea-
sons that the Commission finds so persuasive in other areas.4' Sec-
ond, the occupational licensure program has potentially more dan-
gerous consequences than other FTC programs. If the Commission
38. See Ellis, Legislative Powers: FTC Rulemaking, in CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note
1, at ch. 10; OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & EVALUATION, FTC, MID-YEAR REVIEW (1975-
1976), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 723, special supplement
(1975), and in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 758, at A-6, H-1 (1976). For a
further example, see De Alessi, Regulating Post Purchase Relations: Mobile Homes, in
CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note 1, at ch. 12. These sources, and those cited in notes 40-42,
elaborate in great detail the conclusions stated in the text here.
The Administrative Conference of the United States recently proposed that the FTC
use information from disciplines other than law in determining whether to propose rules.
See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 903, at A-15 (1979). This recommendation
implicitly includes a condemnation of the agency for ignoring such disciplines, particularly
economics.
39. De Alessi, supra note 38.
40. Peterson, Rewriting Consumer Contracts: Creditors' Remedies, in CLARKSON &
MURIS, supra note 1, at ch. 11.
41. For a compilation of this and similar statements, see T. Muris, Evaluation of Pro-
posed Creditors' Remedies Rule (Nov. 1974) (on file as part of rulemaking record) (available
from the authors).
42. For evidence that the Commission is showing increased concern that deregulation
will reduce quality, see ANTITRUST TRADE & REG. REP. (BNA) No. 922, at A-9 (1979).
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has the power to preempt state law, it may substitute its own regu-
latory regime. Although the effect of state regulation is often bad,
the performance of the Commission could be worse. For example,
the available empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that in
preempting numerous state laws the creditors' remedies rule has
harmed consumers, particularly poor ones.' Moreover, the "eye-
glass rule" reveals that new regulatory requirements are already
appearing in the occupational licensure program. A major part of
that rule would preempt state laws prohibiting advertising," thus
tending to reduce regulation. Another provision, however, imposes
a new regulation designed to separate eye examination from the
dispensing of ophthalmic goods by requiring doctors to furnish to
their customers a copy of the prescription immediately after the
examination. 45
This "separation rule" not only tends to confirm the predic-
tion that new regulations will emerge from the preemption process,
it also reflects the Commission's propensity to regulate without ad-
equate justification. The Bureau of Consumer Protection report,4
upon which the Commission relied heavily in support of the rule,
argues that consumers otherwise would not be able to gain from
any increase in advertising. 7 In states that have allowed advertis-
ing, however, the Commission's own findings indicate that prices
are lower,' 8 even though in at least some of these states examina-
tion and dispensing are not separated.' 9 If consumer gains from
advertising require the separation of dispensing and examination,
then it is unclear why observations reveal lower prices in states
that allow advertising but do not require the separation of these
two services.
The Bureau of Consumer Protection report also argues that
opticians, who do not examine eyes, but merely fill prescriptions,
43. Peterson, supra note 40.
44. Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 456.3 (1980).
45. Id. § 456.7.
46. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FTC, ADVERTISING OF OPHTHALMIC GOODS AND
SERVICES AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE (1977). [hereinafter cited as OPHTHALMIC
GooDs.)
47. Id. at 259.
48. Id. at 120. We do not mean the analysis in the text to be an exhaustive empirical
evaluation. It does suggest, however, that the explanation of the Commission is, at least, too
facile.
49. Indeed, the Commission noted that "[i]n virtually every instance in which practic-
ing optometrists were surveyed . . . it was found that in excess of 50% imposed some re-




would suffer competitive injury without the separation rule.50 This
argument is similarly weak. Unless opticians provide lower cost or
higher quality services compared to other dispensers of ophthalmic
goods, their demise would be of no moment to consumers. If, on
the other hand, opticians are in some sense superior to other dis-
pensers, they could easily avoid the problem of being unable to
examine eyes by combining with eye examiners. Large chain stores,
using advertising to become increasingly prominent sellers of
ophthalmic goods, could combine examination by optometrists
with dispensing by the lower. cost (or higher quality) opticians,
thereby producing the best possible package for many consumers.5'
The "separation rule" is not only unjustifiable according to
the Commission's arguments, but it may actually cause harm.
Some consumers and producers may benefit when firms examine
and dispense from one source, and the rule may frustrate realiza-
tion of these benefits. For example, because a consumer who re-
ceives a detectably inferior product may have difficulty determin-
ing whether fault lies with the examiner or the dispenser, each of
these suppliers will want to protect himself against unfounded ac-
cusations pf poor quality by controlling the actions of the other.
Integration of the two functions into a single firm provides this
protection, and integration may also reduce production costs. Ad-
ditionally, the costs to the consumer of searching for suitable firms
to provide each function separately may be higher when the rule
requires separation.
If the "separation rule" illustrates the propensities of the FTC
in the preemptive occupational licensure program, then the result
of the licensure program will not simply be the elimination of bur-
densome state regulations. Rather, we can expect the FTC to bring
forth a new set of federal regulations with burdens of their own."
50. OPHTHALMIC GOODS, supra note 46, at 264.
51. If the problem is that ethical or other restrictions prevent opticians and examiners
from combining, then the FTC should attack these restrictions.
An additional fact of the separation rule is noteworthy. Even if separation of examina-
tion from dispensing is necessary for advertising to result in greater price competition, the
separation requirement would presumably become unnecessary once competition had set in.
Accordingly, the FTC could have written a sunset provision into the rule, allowing the sepa-
ration requirement to expire after a period of time. Failure to include such a provision is
further evidence of the FTC's distrust of market forces.
52. The development of a theory adequate to explain FTC behavior is beyond the scope
of this article. We cannot, therefore, predict the agency's future actions with the confidence
such a theory would allow. To the extent that past attitudes of the FTC toward regulation
are a trustworthy basis for prediction, however, it appears likely that most future FTC pre-
emption rules will mandate new regulations, not just eliminate those of the states. See
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Having seen how the occupational licensure program might fare
within the agency, we examine in the next sections what impacts
the Congress and the judiciary are likely to have on FTC regula-
tory action.
V. THE FTC AND THE CONGRESS
The Congress appears to be a major force in constraining the
Commission because of its many methods of control. In this sec-
tion, we consider whether that appearance accurately reflects real-
ity. We divide Congressional authority over the FTC into four ma-
jor categories. First, Congress can shape the agency through the
annual authorization and appropriation process. Second, Congress
can engage in overall oversight or surveillance of the agency
through questionnaires, investigations, and hearings. Third, Con-
gress may focus at any time on specific questions, a process re-
ferred to here as "ad hoc monitoring." Finally, Congress may
change the legislative authority that governs the Commission's
programs.
A. Congressional Authorization and Appropriation
Some scholars contend that congressional control over the
agency's budget is the most effective constraint on agencies.'8 By
this view, Congress influences agencies by adjusting the total funds
appropriated to the agency and by allocating expenditures within
various agency programs. For example, Congress may encourage
particular policies by "earmarking" funds, or it may discourage
other policies by limiting the use of funds or the number of agency
personnel. Specific examples of this form of control include con-
gressional earmarking of separate funds for FTC truth-in-lending
enforcement in fiscal years 1969 and 1970, and for the FTC study
of the oil industry following the energy crisis of 1973-1974.
Congress has not, however, significantly used this controlling
power to constrain agency action. Since 1970 Congress has signifi-
CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note 1, at ch. 15 (developing in general terms the framework for a
theory of FTC behavior). Among the conclusions relevant to the occupational licensure pro-
gram are that the existence of even partially deregulatory rules is consistent with resolution
of internal conflicts in the FTC, and that deregulatory and regulatory rules bear the com-
mon thread of preemption. Such preemption represents a significant increase in FTC power.
Increases in FTC power increase the future wealth of nongovernment lawyers who specialize
in FTC work, a position to which most FTC attorneys aspire.
53. See, e.g., R. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1966). See also THE POLITICS OF
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964).
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cantly increased the FTC budget, despite frequent opposition to
many FTC policies. Table I" shows that in each year since fiscal
year 1970, FTC budget requests have been equal to or below the
54. Table I
Budget Requests, Appropriations, and Actual Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1970-1980
(millions of dollars)
Administration, exec-
Fiscal Maintaining Consumer Economic utive direction, and
year competition protection activities other expenditures Total
1970















Appropriation 8,658" 10,995. - 2,277 21,930'




Request 9,430- 12,151- - 2,345 23,926
Appropriation 8,466" 13,307" - 3,319 25,092
Actual expenditure 5,609 12,131 2,266 5,986 25,092
1973
Request 9,660" 14,538a - 2,875 27,073
Appropriation 7,006" 14,865a 3,425 5,134 30,430
Actual expenditure 6,149 13,694 2,533 7,829 30,205
1974
Request 7,335 13,838 3,671 5,246 30,090
Appropriation 8,332 14,394 3,995 5,619 32,340'
Actual expenditure 9,427 15,217 2,557 5,122 32,334
1975
Request 9,900 16,436 4,770 6,998 38,104
Appropriation 12,382 17,702 . 3,402 5,512 38.998r
Actual expenditure 12,296 16,981 3,003 6,648 38,983
1976
Request 15,511 19,878 4,135 6,125 45,649
Appropriation 17,672 19,061 4,074 6,284 47,091
Actual expenditure 15,968 18,739 3,745 6,618 47,199
1976 Transition quarter
Appropriation 4,418 4,765 1,019 2,219 12,421V
Actual expenditure 4,153 4,878 974 2,541 12,543
1977
Request 23,309 18,685 4,197 6,642 52,833









Request 24,327 22,936 4,156 8,124 59,543






























6,164 d 0.1 69,021








b-includes truth in lending.
c-includes supplemental.
d-includes administration and executive direction.
Source: The Budget of the United States Government, App. A, fiscal years 1970 through 1980.
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amount that Congress authorized except for fiscal years 1979 and
1980.' 5 In fiscal year 1979, although the Congress appropriated less
for consumer protection than the Commission requested, the total
appropriation for all activities exceeded the total requested. In
fiscal year 1980, when the Commission was under serious attack,
its total appropriations were only 1.8% below the amount re-
quested. Congress has often approved supplemental appropria-
tions, making the actual spending levels higher than originally ap-
propriated. For example, the estimated fiscal year 1980
supplemental appropriation for FTC personnel costs was
$2,456,000. 56
An investigation of direct program expenditures on occupa-
tional licensure and related activities yields similar conclusions. In
recent years, planned occupational licensure program expenditures
have been growing both absolutely and relatively (when compared
with total consumer protection spending, of which occupational li-
censure is a part). Thus, in fiscal year 1976 the request was
$580,000, or 3.5% of the consumer protection mission.5 7 In fiscal
year 1977 the occupational licensure program's requested planned
expenditures had grown to $787,000, or 5.1% of the consumer pro-
tection mission. 58 By fiscal year 1978 the expenditure requested
was $1,197,000, or 6.1% of the consumer protection mission, 9 and
in fiscal year 1979 it was $1,480,000, or 7.2% of the consumer pro-
tection mission. 0
55. A measure that focuses on the difference between the OMB-approved request and
congressional appropriation may be crude because the FTC could modify its request to
OMB or OMB could modify its allowance (the offered request to Congress) to meet ex-
pected congressional action. Despite these problems the measure provides useful evidence
about relations between the FTC and Congress when the congressional appropriation is
above or below the official request to Congress. More important, the change in congressional
appropriations over time has been positive.
56. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FIscAL YEAR 1981, H.R. Doc. No. 247,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1114 (1980). The initial estimated fiscal year 1980 appropriation for the
FTC was for $65,300,000, in 1980.
57. FTC 1976 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of
State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1975) (statement of Lewis A. Engman).
58. FTC 1977 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of
State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1651 (1976) (statement of Richard E. Wiley).
59. FTC 1978 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of
State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
34 (1977) (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
60. FTC 1979 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of
State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
854 (1978) (statement of Michael Pertachuk).
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Using the overall budget level to reward and punish the FTC
is a very crude means of control. Although Congress can effectively
control the FTC's overall budget, it is significantly limited in shap-
ing the direction and substance of FTC programs. The Commis-
sion's budget is divided among consumer protection, maintaining
competition, and other activities (economic support, compliance,
and administration compose most of this category).61 Within the
two major missions-consumer protection and maintaining compe-
tition-there are hundreds of activities.' Congress could not stop
or expand a particular activity by dictating the Commission's total
budget or its budget by mission. Instead, Congress would have to
address the specific activity at issue. Obtaining and digesting the
voluminous information necessary to judge the merits of individual
Commission activities is so complicated and costly that close con-
gressional supervision of specific FTC projects is unlikely. And
even when knowledge about specific programs is available and un-
derstandable, Congress would need to update it continually.
Thus, if we assume that Congress overcomes the first hurdle,
acquiring adequate information about the hundreds of individual
FTC activities, it could specify actual resource levels of both dol-
lars and personnel to each activity. Nevertheless, circumstances
change. Unless Congress has continued access to information nec-
essary to modify Commission activities accurately, misallocation of
public resources is unavoidable. Most important, these powers
would transform Congress into an administrative agency, a trans-
formation that would be extremely costly, if not impossible.
There are exceptions to the rule that the Congress is ineffec-
tive in changing specific FTC resource allocations. In 1975, when
the Commission curtailed its investigations of the condominium in-
dustry, Congress forced continued Commission effort by appropri-
ating resources specifically for condominium law enforcement. 63
But until very recently, this effort stood virtually alone, and it in-
volved resources of less than two-tenths of one percent of the
61. See CLARKSON & Mums, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
62. Id. at chs. 10-14.
63. Condominium Consumer Protection Act of 1975: Hearings on § 2273 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
also Federal Trade Commission Condominium Decision and Operations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 30, 1975); Condominium Development
and Sales Practices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegoti-
ation of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (Feb.
18, 19, May 19, 22, 1976).
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FTC's total budget.6"
Because Congress lacks complete information, the agency has
the power to reallocate (or "reprogram") its resources to meet
changing economic and social conditions. Thus, when a new prob-
lem arises the Commission may divert resources from one or more
existing cases to combat the new problem. Reprogramming is
clearly within the scope of Commission alternatives. The actual ap-
propriation language is extremely general, permitting great flex-
ibility. In fiscal year 1979, for example, the initial authorization of
the FTC was "for necessary expenses of the Federal Trade Com-
mission" and amounted to $64,750,000.65 Moreover, the Comptrol-
ler General of the United States has stated that he was "not aware
of any statute or regulation which requires committee approval of
reprogramming by the FTC."" Some members of Congress have
attempted to prevent the agency from shifting funds from one ac-
tivity to another. In fiscal year 1975, for example, the appropria-
tions committee stated that "except as provided in existing law,
funds provided in the act shall be available only for the purpose
for which they were appropriated. 6 7 The attempt to limit the
Commission's fund-shifting ability failed, however, and the
reprogramming power of the FTC remained intact and frequently
exercised.
B. Oversight
Besides the budget process, Congress also oversees the FTC
through the General Accounting Office (GAO) and congressional
committees. An examination of the record since 1970 reveals no
evidence that Congress has effectively used these methods to con-
strain the FTC.
Although several GAO inquiries have resulted in reports,"8
64. Calculated from the data given in text accompanying note 61 supra.
65. 92 Stat. 1040 (1978).
66. Letter from the'Comptroller General of the United States to John E. Moss, Chair-
man, House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance (July 24, 1974) (copy available from
the authors upon request).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1120, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
68. A letter supplied by GAO to the authors identified 15 documents issued between
1970 and 1977 that dealt with the FTC. Nine of the 15 documents were letters sent by GAO
to the FTC or Congress members, dealing with topics such as the Flammable Fabrics Act,
government procurement, the line-of-business program, information search and copy fees,
and the monitoring of the oil industry. The other six documents dealt with fees and charges
of regulatory agencies, the advertisement substantiation program, the Webb-Pomerene Act,
the energy industry, and GAO's responsibilities under the Federal Reports Act (copies are
on file with the authors). Based on a survey of official documents and interviews with previ-
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Congress has not undertaken to resolve identified problems. The
most obvious .example occurred in 1974, when Congress directed
the GAO to work with the FTC to resolve some important
problems associated with the Commission's line-of-business pro-
gram. 9 Congress apparently ignored the report of the GAO made
in March 1975 to the Committee on Appropriations concerning
problems in the management program of the FTC.7 0 Subsequent
congressional hearings indicated that the only questions concern-
ing the line-of-business program focused on total expenditures and
the confidentiality of the data.71 The congressional hearings made
no reference to criticisms by the GAO of the line-of-business pro-
gram and, as a result, the Commission did not alter its program.~
No evidence indicates any substantial lessening in FTC line-of-
business activities resulting from outside pressures, including pres-
sure from those who sought to use Congress to abolish or reduce
the scope of the program.
As for congressional committees, in 1975 and 1978 two de-
tailed questionnaires were sent to the Federal Trade Commission
from the Government Operations Committee of the Senate.7 3 The
answers to the 1975 questions (ninety-six in all) filled approxi-
mately two regular file drawers. Although the agency spent consid-
erable time in carefully answering these questions, they were more
a nuisance than an effective check on FTC action. Our investiga-
tions revealed no changes in FTC substantive actions because of
this oversight activity. 4
Although the oversight committee occasionally holds hearings
on the Commission,7' its greatest concern seems to be why there is
ous and present FTC commissioners and officials, the effects of the GAO inquiries were
minimal.
69. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States to John Moss, Chairman,
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance (July 24, 1974) (copy available from au-
thors upon request).
70. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Appropriations (March 5, 1975) (copy available from authors).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.R. Doc. No. 95.134, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (hereinafter called the 1975
Moss questionnaire). In 1978 another questionnaire was submitted to the FTC and returned
to the committee (hereinafter called the 1978 Moss questionnaire). The results were not
published but are in the authors' files. They are available upon request.
74. See generally CLARKSON & Mus, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
75. See, e.g., FTC 1976 Budget Request: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
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delay in certain cases or rules."6 For example, in 1976, oversight
hearings examined FTC effectiveness in eliminating unfair and de-
ceptive advertising practices. The testimony presented by FTC of-
ficials amounted to a mere description of FTC progress and a re-
port on expenditures.7 Other hearings revealed a similar pattern
of questioning.
Part of the problem is that members of the oversight commit-
tee face the same information problems that confront members of
the appropriations committee. Even if the committee members ac-
quire information about a program, the Commission can pool sev-
eral experts on the subject, who in total (and often individually)
know more about the topic than do the committee members or
their staffs. These experts can usually derail congressional inquir-
ies that may reveal program weaknesses. In sum, one cannot ex-
pect the oversight committee to constrain the FTC effectively.
C. Ad Hoc Monitoring
Ad hoc monitoring involves informal contacts with the Com-
mission, formal hearings, and congressional inquiries. Although lit-
tle is known about informal contacts between members of Congress
and the Commission, FTC officials treat members of Congress and
other individuals with the deference that their positions deserve.
The influence upon FTC programs of individual members of Con-
gress acting outside their official capacity, however, appears lim-
ited. Of course, a politically powerful member of Congress with a
close relationship to one or more commissioners or top staff mem-
bers has an increased probability of influencing some Commission
decisions. This kind of influence, however, is not limited to con-
gressional members. Anyone who has influence with one of these
FTC officials could similarly influence the agenda of the FTC.
These informal contacts become particularly important only in pe-
riods of general political hostility toward the Commission, a condi-
tion discussed at more length in Part D of this Section. Chairper-
sons of the FTC oversight and appropriations committees, as well
as other members of Congress influential in legislation affecting
76. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Appropriations (Mar. 5, 1975) (copy available from authors upon
request).
77. Oversight Hearings into the Federal Trade Commission-Bureau of Consumer
Protection (Delays in Rulemaking-Regulation of Advertising): Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Governmen-
tal Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976).
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the FTC, possess unusual influence in such periods and accord-
ingly receive unusual deference from the FTC.
More visible forms of ad hoc monitoring involve formal hear-
ings and other official congressional inquiries that focus on particu-
lar issues. Several such inquiries took place during the 1970's.
Chairman Collier's confirmation hearings, for example, focused ex-
tensively on his expected enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. '8 Several members of Congress, backed
by small business groups, strongly favored continuation of Robin-
son-Patman cases.79 Despite their extensive questioning on this is-
sue, and the existence of a special committee to pressure the
FTC,80 enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act remained mini-
mal after Collier's appointment as Chairman of the Commission.8'
Congress has recently attempted to monitor the Commission
more closely. The number of Federal Trade Commission appear-
ances before the Congress in the first half of the 1970's was rela-
tively constant and below thirty per year.82 Beginning in 1975,
however, the number of congressional hearings increased by more
than one-third. These hearings greatly increased the time and ef-
fort expended by the Commission in responding to congressional
inquiries and thus had a potential constraining effect upon the
Commission. Nonetheless, only rarely have these hearings affected
a Commission decision about whether to bring a case or promul-
gate a rule.
The hearings involving the funeral rule are an example of the
Commission's spending increased time before Congress without ap-
preciably diminishing its investigative and rulemaking activity. In-
dustry representatives appearing before Congress were generally
funeral directors who were also officers in industry organizations.
They objected to FTC interference and rulemaking, and claimed
such actions were unnecessary because few consumers complained
about the funeral industry.8 8 Industry representatives asserted that
78. Nominations: Jan.-Apr. Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 84-107 (1976).
79. Id.
80. See generally CLARKSON & MURIs, supra note 1, ch. 1 n.24.
81. Id.
82. We estimated the number of hearings per year by examining the listings for the
FTC in the annual index of the Congressional Information Service. See Congressional In-
formation Service, Annual Index, (1970-1979) (each year is a separate volume).
83. See, e.g., Regulations of Various Federal Regulatory Agencies and Their Effect on
Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the
House Comm. on Small Business, Part III, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-373 (1975); id. Part IV,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-67 (1976).
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the rule would not only increase the cost of funerals but also re-
duce the number of funeral homes by twenty-five percent, driving
smaller homes out of business.8' They also questioned the author-
ity of the FTC to preempt state law, alleging that certain practices
in the Commission's rulemaking proceeding were unfair.8 5 Further-
more, the funeral directors claimed that the FTC action aroused
suspicion toward even reputable funeral homes.86
Openly hostile toward the agency, the members of Congress
focused on FTC expenditures of $450,000 to develop a program
that the Commission had initiated when it had received fewer than
a dozen complaints about the funeral industry.8 7 The committee
members were also upset because the Commission had consulted
very few state officials.8 8 They expressed concern that the Commis-
sion had wasted money, particularly because there were many
Robinson-Patman complaints to which it had not responded.8 '
As with an increasing number of industries under FTC scru-
tiny, the funeral industry and the small business managers who
wanted more Robinson-Patman enforcement had sought to re-
strain the agency through Congress. In both cases, well-organized
groups generated enthusiastic support in some quarters of Con-
gress to apply extreme pressure on the Commission. Even though
such pressure forced the Commission to expend resources to de-
fend itself,90 the pressure did not appreciably constrain its choice
of which industries to pursue. Indeed, because Congress lacks the
motivation and the means to check the agency, and because the
FTC has cultivated supporters in Congress for its activities, even
its most controversial programs meet little resistance there. The
Commission's efforts to regulate the funeral industry, children's
advertising, and line-of-business reporting demonstrate Congress's
inability to deter FTC action through the various methods already
discussed.
At times, however, congressional opposition may effectively
constrain the Commission. Until late 1977, the political environ-
ment in which the FTC operated decreased the likelihood of con-





88. Id. at 67-68.
89. Id. at 61.
90. The agency must respond in good faith to congressional inquiries to avoid congres-
sional attacks on its authority and budget unrelated to the substance of FTC programs.
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effective constraint available to Congress. By late 1977 and early
1978, however, the political support for the Commission had signif-
icantly diminished. By late 1979, new legislation limiting the power
of the FTC appeared likely, and the FTC began responding to this
change in the political environment. It is ultimately the threat of
new legislation, rather than the oversight function (with its attend-
ant "grilling" of the agency staff and occasional unfavorable pub-
licity), that appears most likely to constrain the Commission.
D. Legislative Authority
Legislation, although generally limited as a tool in con-
straining FTC decisionmakers, is the most powerful tool available
to Congress. Through legislation, Congress can exempt industries
from FTC rules, stop new programs, or remove general rulemaking
power from the agency. The most severe restriction on legislative
control is a political environment "favorable" to the Commission.
Even when many members of Congress strongly oppose FTC ac-
tions, the environment will still be favorable as long as enough
members support, or merely accept, Commission activity to pre-
vent effective legislative constraint.
Assuming an unfavorable political environment, Congress has
two major devices to constrain the FTC effectively: massive budget
cuts and legislation reducing or eliminating FTC powers (either
general powers, such as. rulemaking, or authority over particular
industries). The environment must be so unfavorable, however,
that legislation will pass both houses and be signed by the Presi-'
dent. The more likely the legislation is to constrain the Commis-
sion, the less likely it is to pass, given the ability of the Commis-
sion to manipulate the political environment.9 1 Thus, the FTC
does not require extensive influence or support in Congress before
congressional controls over the agency become, as a practical mat-
ter, ineffective.
The impact of the hostility toward the FTC in the last few
years indicates the difficulty of constraining the agency. The con-
troversial activities of the FTC in consumer protection and anti-
trust throughout the 1970's eventually aroused a reaction in Con-
gress. An early indication that the pendulum was swinging away
from support for Commission activity came in 1977, less than two
years after the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act had given the Commission expanded pow-
91. For one such scenario, see [1979] 85 FTC WATCH 8.
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ers. When the FTC requested certain reforms (such as improved
methods of enforcing subpoenas and recognition for private en-
forcement of its rules) not only did Congress refuse the reforms,
but the House also tried to insist on a legislative veto.2 For three
years before the passage of the 1980 authorization bill, the FTC
had no actual authorization, subsisting instead on a series of con-
tinuing resolutions. In 1980, the authorization of the Commission
ran out before Congress renewed it, resulting in a brief shutdown
of the agency." While thus beggaring the FTC, Congress was con-
sidering a variety of proposals to limit the Commission's powers.
Heavy lobbying by business interests contributed to this
"backlash" against the FTC, which reached a peak in late 1979.
Many people felt the Commission had greatly exceeded its man-
date and was raging uncontrolled. The Senate version of the 1980
appropriations bill illustrates the results of this lobbying. The bill
would have restricted FTC activities in insurance sales, safety
standards for consumer products, and television advertising aimed
at children." Moreover, the House bill would have ended the fu-
neral industry investigation, the Sunkist monopoly case, and the
challenge to the Formica trademark.'5
The FTC's attacks on state occupational regulations also at-
tracted the attention of the agency's critics. In a committee hear-
ing on the FTC, the American Medical Association's representative
cited the eyeglasses rule as an example of the FTC's having "gone
too far."" An amendment to the Senate bill that would have pro-
hibited the FTC from using funds for investigation or rulemaking
concerning any "State-regulated legal, dental, medical, or other
health-related profession, ' 97 was narrowly defeated, 45-47.9s
Despite all of the hostility, the Federal Trade Commission Im-
92. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA) No. 942, at A-6 (1979).
93. ANTITRUST & TRADE R G. Rzp. (BNA) No. 963, at A-13 (1980); [1980] 95 FTC
WATCH 5.
94. An amendment to the Senate bill proposed by Senator Heflin would have denied
the power of the FTC to require divestiture as a remedy in cases not involving merger. The
Heflin amendment failed, and the eventual compromise version of the bill retained only a
few of these features, in watered-down form.
95. Washington Post, March 23, 1980, § E, at 1, 6, col. 1.
96. ANTITRUST & TRADE RIo. REP. (BNA) No. 931, at A-25 (1979).
97. 126 CONG. REc. (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1980).
98. Id. at § 1116. Opponents of the amendment argued that state regulation of these
occupations was often more friendly to practitioners than to the public, and that letting the
FTC regulate health professions would actually reduce the number of restrictions imposed,
since the FTC would preempt many state rules.
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provements Act of 1980 left most FTC programs intact.9 A few
industries did win special protection from FTC authority, but most
controversial FTC programs continued unabated. Moreover, the
budget of the Commission continues to grow. Given the hostility,
the FTC Improvements Act of 1980 contained surprisingly gener-
ous authorizations of seventy million dollars for fiscal year 1980,
seventy-five million dollars for fiscal year 1981, and eighty million
dollars for fiscal year 1982. The Act also failed to resolve funda-
mental issues regarding the Commission, particularly the agency's
lack of constraints. 100 Even the procedural changes appear to have
minimal impacts on the Commission. In fact, some commentators
have argued that the FTC did very well in responding to the con-
gressional assault.101
A further limitation that inhibits an unfavorable environment
from effectively constraining the Commission is that it is not likely
to be a continuous and pervasive constraint. FTC history indicates
that any highly unfavorable environment will probably be of short
duration. Further, serious informational problems remain that
limit the Congress's ability to constrain the Commission, except for
a few highly visible programs.
Finally, the nature of the legislative process itself limits the
ability of Congress to impose constraints on the FTC, even with
new legislation. Explicit legislative authority or prohibitions may
harm all parties involved because the final legislation may be the
product of compromise resulting in provisions that no single mem-
ber of the Commission or Congress desires. For example, in 1977
Congress rejected proposed amendments to the FTC Act designed
to increase FTC power by giving the Commission additional proce-
dural rights and permitting private enforcement of FTC trade reg-
ulation rules in cease and desist orders.'"2 Over the FTC's opposi-
tion, the amendments also included a one-house veto power. The
House and the Senate disagreed over various sections of the bill,
and it never became law.
03
E. Congressional Incentives and Control of the FTC
Despite the increased time it has spent monitoring the FTC,
99. See Conference Report on Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at Special Supp. (1980).
100. Id. at 7.
101. See, e.g., ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 962, at A-13 (1980).
102. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 835, at A-2 (1977).
103. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 883, at A-5 to A-7 (1978).
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because of the absence of an unfavorable political environment,
Congress has had little impact on directing or redirecting resources
within the Commission since 1970. This lack of influence is largely
the product of the structure of Congress itself.
First, Congress has organized most of its work by commit-
tees.'04 Because appointments to committees that deal with the
Federal Trade Commission are not those most sought by members
of the House or the Senate,'"6 committee members often come
from the ranks of lower seniority and often include newly elected
Congress members. The lower status of committees monitoring the
FTC and the lower level of experience of members of Congress on
those committees reduce the effectiveness of congressional control
of the Commission.
Second, a number of competing interest groups, including bu-
reaucrats, businesses, consumers, and taxpayers, make demands on
Congress. ' Interest groups affect Congress in two important ways.
The very nature of an interest group dictates that its lobbying and
other political resource activities will focus on options that benefit
its members as opposed to the population as a whole. In addition,
the personal incentives of members of Congress are similar to
those of the interest groups. Constituents who receive aid will
often credit their representative for delivering the benefits. In re-
turn, politicians receive rewards in the form of electoral support
and campaign contributions.107
The existence of interest groups has important consequences
for these incentives and the ability of Congress to control the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. Various groups seek differing objectives,
resulting in a variant of the "voters' paradox." For example, a coa-
lition of interest groups may prefer policy A over policy B, and
another prefer B over policy C, and a third prefer C over A.108
Thus, if no single position commands a majority and the interest
groups have similar strength, Congress will have considerable free-
104. See generally C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: His WORK AS HE SEES IT (1964).
105. One may confirm this observation by examining the choice of committees by senior
members of Congress.
106. In our discussion, we will assume that the groups organize themselves for well-
defined purposes. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the free rider and other
problems associated with group activity. See, e.g., M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY Or GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971); Stigler, Free-Riders and
Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 359
(1974).
107. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977).
108. K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); J. BUCHANON &
M. FLOWERS, THE PUBLIC FINANCES: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXTBOOK (4th ed. 1975).
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dom in choosing among alternative policies because the combina-
tion of any two coalitions forms a majority to support any one of
the three policies. Thus, the incentive to challenge the Commission
directly on certain decisions diminishes.
A further implication of interest group politics is that the in-
formation and complaints that Congress and the Commission re-
ceive may fail to reflect accurately the concerns of the population
as a whole. In an empirical investigation of consumer participation
in Federal Trade Commission proceedings, LaBarbera found that
consumers who actually communicated with the Commission came
from groups that contained more older, better educated, and rela-
tively affluent whites than did the public at large. Furthermore,
these consumers also viewed the marketplace more negatively than
did the public at large and correspondingly favored more govern-
ment regulation to "protect" the consumer. 10 9 Thus, it is a mistake
to treat these individuals as representing all consumers, as the
Commission sometimes does.
A third significant aspect of the relationship between the
structure of Congress and control over the FTC is that the incen-
tive of individual members of Congress to monitor the FTC is less
than their incentive to monitor many other agencies. The budget
of the FTC is relatively small, and the agency does not hand out
subsidies, resource rights, or other direct benefits that individual
groups seek. Of course, FTC decisions do impact upon producing
and consuming groups, some of which provide major political sup-
port to members of Congress. Absent Congress's narrowing the
range of actions available to the FTC, however, it is harder to turn
these impacts into a form of political pressure leading to control
over the agency than it is to use direct monetary subsidies to the
various groups for the same purpose.
Fourth, the general inability of Congress to monitor individual
FTC programs implies that Congress will neither seek complete in-
formation nor engage in excessive questioning during FTC hear-
ings. Although it is impossible to specifically test this hypothesis,
an examination of appropriation hearings from fiscal years 1970
through 1979 generally confirms this prediction. The official
records suggest that members of Congress used incomplete infor-
mation in reviewing the proposed budget. For example, an exami-
109. P. LaBarbera, An Empirical Investigation of Consumer Participants in Federal
Trade Commission Consumer Protection Rule-Making Procedures (1976) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University); see also ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. Rm.
(BNA) No. 663, at D-1 (1973) for an example of consumer group activity.
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nation of hearings during the entire 1970's reveals that beyond the
brief FTC budget summaries, the agency rarely provided informa-
tion about FTC programs to either the Senate or the House, pre-
sumably because neither body requested it.110
Even more revealing are the number and types of questions
that members of Congress asked the Commission during the hear-
ings. A reading of the congressional questions for each of the hear-
ings from fiscal years 1970 through 1979 suggests a definite pat-
tern.1" Members asked few questions, and those questions sought
general information, such as the amount allocated for enforcement
of the textiles and fur acts, or the number of cases instituted under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Members also asked the Commission
to explain certain processes, such as rulemaking and case selection,
or to provide status reports for particular programs. Although the
Congress may use its power to influence the Commission's agenda,
such monitoring places few, if any, constraints on the agency.
1 1 2
Finally, an examination of FTC hearings during the 1970's
reveals that Congress occasionally used the hearings to duck issues
rather than to monitor the Commission. For example, in 1974 the
FTC, at congressional urging, spent a substantial amount of time
investigating the putative shortage of canning lids."' This investi-
gation, which produced no cases, finally ended after public pres-
sure subsided, permitting the Commission to redirect its resources
to other tasks. The canning lids experience does illustrate one in-
fluence of Congress: an ability to convince the Federal Trade Com-
mission to investigate a particular practice. Although Congress
may use its power to influence the agenda of the Commission,
starting an investigation does not make FTC law enforcement
mandatory or even likely, particularly when the agency decides
merely to study the problem and report its findings to Congress.
In sum, we conclude that in addition to limitations on Con-
gress's power to control particular programs of the Commission, in-
dividual members of Congress, faced by numerous competing in-
terests, will lack the incentive to control most FTC activities.
Thus, unless some interest groups have influence greatly in excess
110. See FTC Budget Justifications at House and Senate Appropriations Comm.
Hearings, 1970-1979.
111. Id.
112. See CLARKSON & Mums, supra note 1, at 29-32.
113. Shortage of Home Canning Equipment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com-
modities and Services of the Subcomm. on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the House
Comm. on Small Business, Part V, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976).
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of others, as producer groups appeared to have in late 1979, Con-
gress will not exercise extensive control over the Commission.
F. Modifying Congressional Controls: The Legislative Veto
One of the more contested provisions of the recently enacted
Improvements Act was the proposed legislative veto," ' a device av-
idly sought by some members of Congress."'8 Some found the legis-
lative veto a promising form of congressional control:
While a legislative veto requires routine submission of rules to
114. The one-house provision is in H.R. 2313, (94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), the original
House version of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
252, § 21, 94 Stat. 393 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 15 U.S.C.). Because President
Carter threatened to veto the legislative veto provision, and because only the House favored
the stronger one-house veto, the bill that passed was a compromise, allowing for a two-house
veto.
The Act provides the targets of FTC rulemaking proceedings with extra procedural pro-
tections and increases the participation of Congress in FTC rulemaking. Sections 3, 4, and
14 of the Improvements Act impose restrictions on the release by the FTC of confidential
information the agency obtains during its investigations. If the information obtained by the
agency is either a trade secret or financial or commercial information that is privileged or
confidential, the agency may reveal it after receiving the consent of those persons interested
in the item. If the interested persons do not consent to the release of the information, the
FTC may release it only to law enforcement agencies for official law enforcement purposes,
to Congress after giving notice to the interested party, to an attorney for the interested
party, as necessary in judicial proceedings to which it is a party, or when a statute requires
the release. Section 15 of the Improvements Act requires the FTC to publish a regulatory
analysis of each rule with its notice of proposed rulemaking and with the publication of the
final rule in the Federal Register. The regulatory analysis must contain an estimate of the
economic costs and benefits of the rule and an explanation of the alternatives the agency
considered. Other important procedural protections in the Improvements Act include a re-
quirement in section 9 that hearing officers independent of the main FTC hierarchy conduct
rulemaking proceedings and a requirement in section 12 that the agency put a verbatim
transcript of relevant ex parte consultations by its officers into the public record of any
rulemaking proceedings.
Provisions of the Improvement Act increase the participation of Congress in FTC
rulemaking proceedings. Section 8 requires the agency to give advance notice of proposed
rulemaking proceedings to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Section 21 provides
for the legislative veto of final FTC rules.
The Improvements Act contains a few prohibitions on FTC activity in specific substan-
tive areas. The form of most of these prohibitions is a command to the FTC not to use any
of its appropriations for fiscal 1980, 1981, and 1982 to continue with pending rulemaking
proceedings in the prohibited areas or to start substantially similar proceedings. The areas
in which Congress has told the FTC to suspend rulemaking include children's television
advertising and the funeral industry. Section 19 of the Improvements Act does contain a
detailed description of a funeral industry rule that Congress would approve. Section 20 of
the Improvements Act prevents the FTC from investigating or prosecuting cases involving
agricultural marketing orders.
115. See Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulations: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (1977).
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Congress for review, in its absence oversight committee hearings
occur sporadically and thus do not provide a regular opportunity
to negotiate the substance of rules with agency personnel ...
In contrast with these traditional oversight techniques, review
under a legislative veto scheme is specifically and narrowly fo-
cused on the substance of proposed rules. Thus, the veto, unlike
any of the traditional oversight techniques, permits regular and
systematic examination of the substantive details of an agency's
program.116
Others find that the veto would invite "political review" of the
Commission, and would give lobbyists and members of interest
groups additional leverage in influencing agency behavior.
The current popularity of the legislative veto indicates that
other methods of controlling the FTC have not been effective. But
even though the veto would increase the constraining power of
Congress-particularly when one interest group is much more pow-
erful than its competitors-not even this measure would effectively
constrain the Commission. First, the veto will only occasionally be
an effective tool. The volume of rules that the Commission passes
will likely be so great, the information necessary to evaluate them
so vast, and the political pressures surrounding the rules so diverse
that continuous, closei and effective scrutiny of the agency remains
unlikely. Although a few Commission rules might be politically
sensitive, Congress, even with its large support staff, is unlikely to
muster the capacity or interest to comprehend the dozens of rule
provisions that the FTC will pass.
Second, because the legislative veto will place more direct re-
sponsibility on the Congress, it would increase the difficulty of
solving (or ducking) problems by referring them to an agency. It is
not clear that Congress wants to exercise such controversial re-
sponsibility. Third, the necessity in Congress for compromise may
well dilute the effectiveness of the legislative veto as a constraint.
Also, there is conflict over the wisdom of vetoing a particular rule.
Thus, even when many members of Congress actively oppose an
FTC rule, the legislative veto would by no means be a surefire way
to stop the occupational licensure program. Although professions
have considerable political power, advocates of deregulation and
some consumer groups would oppose a legislative veto of deregu-
latory rules. In short, there may be enough controversy over occu-
pational regulation rules that a legislative veto would not be auto-
116. Id. at 1422-23.
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matic. A final limit on the effectiveness of the veto is that, given
congressional procedures, each regulation will probably be treated
in combination with other measures by means of logrolling. Some
members of Congress will find a veto less attractive when it is
linked with a proposal they do not favor.'
1 7
For these reasons, direct control of Commission behavior by
the legislative veto does not have a high probability of success.
Thus, the legislative veto is unlikely to provide direct and consis-
tent control over Commission resource allocation.118 In sum, Con-
gress has only a limited ability to monitor individual FTC activi-
ties effectively. Its most effective tools are budget cutting and
restrictive legislation. Yet these tools are most difficult to employ
regularly, and require an intense political climate that is histori-
cally rare and usually brief. Even with its most effective tools, Con-
gress can redirect resources into or away from specific programs
only after detailed analysis at a level beyond the institutional com-
petence of Congress, except for, at most, an occasional project.
Producer and consumer groups often exert pressure through Con-
gress and occasionally force hearings or even investigations. Absent
widespread political support,-however, pressure groups are usually
unsuccessful in redirecting FTC resources. Oversight and ad hoc
monitoring seldom influence Commission activities, although they
do cause the Commission to expend valuable resources in respond-
ing to them.
VI. THE COMMISSION AND THE COURTS
Assuming that the FTC can preempt state law, the crucial
117. See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 107.
118. An additional problem with the veto is that even when the legislative veto influ-
ences the FTC, consumers will not always benefit. This problem stems from the divergence
between the influence and nature of producer and consumer interests. Producer interests
tend to be more influential in Congress because they are more concentrated, and the effect
of this influence on FTC rules varies. When FTC rules are harmful both to businesses and
to consumers as a class, successful producer lobbying would benefit consumers. In other
rules, producer rand consumer interests may differ, as in occupational licensing. Because
some of the FTC rules most beneficial to consumers involve industries with influential mem-
bers in every congressional district in the United States-professions, for example-this
conflict will be serious.
In addition, the veto will not always benefit consumers because consumer interests dif-
fer from those of consumerists to the extent that the latter are not representative of con-
sumers as a class. For example, consumerists with a higher-than-average preference for
quality may effectively lobby the Congress not to veto rules that reflect this preference.
Another reason why the veto is not desirable is that business leaders and legislators tend to
look upon the legislative veto as "the solution" to the problem of the FTC. This quick-fix
attitude decreases the possibility of enacting potentially more effective reforms.
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question becomes whether and how the courts will influence the
occupational licensure program of the Commission. To answer this
question, one must consider to what extent the courts limit the
substantive powers of the FTC.119 Specifically, the issue is whether
the Commission or the courts determine the standard for legality
of a form of occupational regulation challenged by the Commis-
sion.120 A further issue ithe extent of the burden the Commission
should bear when demonstrating the ill effects of occupational reg-
ulation. A final consideration is the degree of deference courts give
to the Commission's judgment when the FTC seeks to promulgate
regulations for various occupations.
This section begins with a discussion of the traditional rela-
tionship between the courts and the FTC. It then considers
whether in recent years the relationship between courts and agen-
cies, including the FTC, is changing and how any such changes
might affect the occupational licensure program. Finally, it dis-
cusses the effect that requiring the FTC to employ cost-benefit
analysis would have on its rules and on its relationship with the
courts.
A. The Traditional Relationship Between the Courts and the
Federal Trade Commission
Initially, the courts attempted to limit the Commission's free-
dom to act. During the Commission's first sixteen years, three Su-
preme Court cases indicated that the judiciary would not give the
agency wide freedom.12 1 In these decisions, judicial review of FTC
119. Treated as substantive is the question of what evidence the FTC must prove to
persuade a court to sustain its findings. We will limit our focus to substantive cases brought
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. While some recent cases have indicated a
greater willingness to limit FTC orders, see, e.g., cases in notes 175-86 and accompanying
text infra, we will not discuss these problems separately here. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the enforcement of FTC orders see CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note 1, at 42-3.
120. To put the issue differently: Assuming that no dispute arises over the facts, will
the courts routinely allow the FTC to decide whether those facts constitute illegality under
the FTC Act? Although our focus will be on the FTC's freedom to define what practices are
illegal, we do not assert that there is an easily discernible line between questions of law and
questions of fact.
121. In FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), the Commission alleged that the respondent
engaged in what was in effect a "tying" arrangement, illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act
and § 5 of the FTC Act. When the Commission argued that the practices were unfair be-
cause they hurt other firms, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the
practices "must be at least such as are unfair to the public generally." 258 F. 314, 317 (2d
Cir. 1919). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the courts or the Commission
would determine what methods of competition are unfair, deciding that "[i]t is for the
courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they [unfair
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actions went beyond deciding if the facts indicated that the alleged
practices took place. These decisions reversed the Commission on
important policy issues such as whether a practice was illegal or
whether its prohibition was in the public interest.
Beginning in the mid-1930's the courts began a shift towards
almost total deference to the FTC.1 22 One example involves cases
brought because of allegedly deceptive acts or practices. In a 1937
decision the Supreme Court found a representation violative of the
FTC Act despite a lower court conclusion that the representation
would deceive only "fools. '"12 8 As time passed, no matter how stu-
pid the FTC apparently believed consumers to be or how beneficial
to consumers the challenged representation might be, the courts
refused to curtail agency action. For example, in 1965, the Su-
preme Court upheld a Commission finding that the continual offer-
ing of paint on a "buy one, get one free" basis was deceptive, al-
though the practice apparently benefited consumers by
methods] include." 253 U.S. at 427. In what eventually became the majority position of the
Court, Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing basically that the FTC should decide what is fair.
Id. at 429, 436 (Brandeis & Clark, JJ., dissenting). In FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929),
the respondent was, in effect, telling consumers that his products were those of another
proprietor. The Supreme Court found that the filing of the complaint was not in the public
interest, in part because "[w]hatever confusion the alleged deception may have caused had
been largely dissipated before the Commission first took action." Id. at 29. As for FTC
power, the Court stated more generally that "the mere fact that it is to the interest of the
community that private rights shall be respected is not enough to support a finding of pub-
lic interest. To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and substan-
tial." Id. at 28. Two years later the Court decided FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
The Commission had charged that the respondent had misled consumers in representing an
"obesity cure." In considering whether the challenged practices were "unfair methods of
competition" within the meaning of § 5 of the FTC Act, the Court again denied the FTC the
power to define legality:
It is obvious that the word "competition" imports the existence of present
or potential competitors, and the unfair methods must be such as injuriously
affect or tend thus to affect the business of these competitors-that is to say, the
trader whose methods are assailed as unfair must have present or potential ri-
vals in trade whose business will be, or is likely to be, lessened or otherwise
injured. It is that condition of affairs which the Commission is given power to
correct, and it is against that condition of affairs, and not some other, that the
Commission is authorized to protect the public.
Id. at 649.
122. It is not the primary purpose of this article to determine the reasons for such
judicial deference. Whether the courts acted out of agreement with the FTC's substantive
positions, a feeling .that the problems before the Commission were too trivial for judicial
concern, a determination that issues such as deception were inherently factual and hence
more appropriate for agency fact-finding, or for some other reason, the result was that the
FTC was free from effective judicial constraint in deciding which practices were illegal.
123. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
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encouraging price competition.12 Further, when an advertiser
claimed that a hair application could "color permanently," the
Commission ruled that the claim was illegal because some people
might believe the product would color hair that had not yet grown
out of their scalp.12 5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, con-
strained by the Supreme Court's command to defer to the FTC,
affirmed.
1 26
As to the standard of deception, the courts eased the burden
of proof required of the FTC by conceding that the agency need
not show actual deception, but only a tendency or capacity to
deceive. 1 7 Coupled with the standard for judicial review of Com-
mission actions-the court would affirm a commission finding if
supported by substantial evidence on the record128-this test made
it virtually impossible to reverse Commission findings of deception.
If this deference were not enough to show the freedom of the
Commission in the area of deception, the courts have also stated
that interpreting the meaning of an advertisement is a matter com-
mitted to the discretion of the FTC.129 As one author has stated,
"this modest sounding rule is a principal reason that the Commis-
sion has managed to prevail in the appellate courts in the over-
whelming majority of its [deception] decisions that have been ap-
pealed."18 0 Moreover, the Commission can determine the meaning
of an advertisement without even sampling public opinion.181
124. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965); see Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:
Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 687-89
(1977).
125. Clairol, Inc., 33 F.T.C. 1450 (1941).
126. Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944).
127. For a detailed discussion, see G. ALEXANDER, supra note 37, at 69.
128. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 591-95 (1976).
129. For a leading discussion on this point, see Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception
Before the Federal Trade Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559 (1 969).
130. See Pitofsky, supra note 124.
131. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944). The reasons for
this deference to the Commission's determination of meaning are by no means clear. Robert
Pitofsky, former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection and now an FTC Commis-
sioner, has stated:
Why questions of meaning should be submitted to the virtually unreviewable
discretion of five commissioners of the FTC has never been articulated. Unlike
other instances of deference to regulators as part of the administrative process,
there is no reason to believe that commissioners of the FTC have unusual capac-
ity or experience in coping with questions of meaning, nor any indication that
successful regulation of advertising requires a balance of related regulatory con-
siderations that commissioners are in a special position to handle.
Pitofsky, supra note 124, at 678.
Pitofsky concludes that a possible reason for the deference may be
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The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the sub-
stantive powers of the FTC, FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (S &
H),5 2 illustrates the ability of the FTC to act with the confidence
that its judicial support extends beyond issues of deception. Sperry
and Hutchinson, the owners of "green stamps," attempted to pre-
vent unauthorized commercial exchangers and redeemers from,
among other things, offering discounts in return for stamps with-
out S & H approval. When the Commission held that S & H's
practices restrained trade under the principles of antitrust law, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,"3 holding that the
practices did not violate either the letter or the spirit of the anti-
trust laws. When the case came before the Supreme Court nine
years after the proceedings began, however, the Commission
shifted its attention from antitrust considerations to focus on a
new theory: unfair acts or practices under the FTC Act.'" To the
Court, whether the FTC could attack S & H's practices as unfair
turned on: 1) whether the Act empowered the Commission to pro-
scribe practices as "unfair" that did not violate either the letter or
the administrative inconvenience of alternative approaches. If consumer percep-
tion were a litigable issue, survey evidence or testimony by experts on consumer
perception would be required. The science of measuring consumer perception is
so imprecise that it is understandable that the Commission would want to avoid
hosting such controversies. In addition, consumer survey evidence raises many
separate evidentiary issues. .. .A full exploration of these issues would compli-
cate and delay enforcement proceedings.
Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
This proposition does not justify the deference of the courts. Although scientific evi-
dence may be imprecise and subject to alternative explanations, it will often be more useful
for deciding meaning than is the intuition of individuals who have no special expertise. As
Pitofsky himself notes, the Commission has used survey evidence in several cases, thus
avoiding complete blindness toward the actual perceptions of consumers. Id. Also, the argu-
ment that the issue should not be litigable solely on the grounds of administrative conve-
nience is peculiar, unless Pitofsky is implying that the costs of litigating the issue of mean-
ing exceed the benefits when applied to Commission activity before 1970. In this regard the
argument has some merit, although not because the Commission made few mistakes. In-
stead, if the agency deals with such trivia as "buy one, get one free" advertising, and if
businesses and consumers can adjust to prohibiting such claims at a small cost, then it is not
worth the time of the judiciary to review the work of such an agency. Although this ratio-
nale is not one that courts would articulate, it may underlie at least some of the past defer-
ence toward the Commission. A further, and probably more important, explanation of court
deference to the FTC in questions of meaning (and other areas of legality) is that the courts
wrote such decisions as FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937), at a time when
many courts and scholars had confidence in the wisdom and ability of administrative agen-
cies. Today, such confidence appears to be the exception rather than the rule. In part C of
this section, we consider whether this change in attitude will affect the FTC.
132. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
133. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970).
134. 405 U.S. at 246.
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spirit of the antitrust laws; and 2) whether the Act empowered the
Commission to proscribe practices as "unfair" because of their ef-
fect upon consumers, regardless of their nature or quality as com-
petitive practices or their effect on competition.I " The Court
found that the Commission had these powers:
[L]egislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congres-
sionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity,
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws. " "
In terms of the relationship between the FTC and the courts,
this decision has at least three notable characteristics. First, and
probably least important, the case demonstrates one form of judi-
cial check upon the FTC: A reviewing court will not affirm the
agency on a theory not relied upon by the Commission in the pro-
ceedings. In a very narrow sense, then, S & H is a defeat for the
FTC. The Court remanded the case to the Commission because the
agency had tried it under an antitrust theory, the Fifth Circuit had
concluded that the practices did not violate either the letter or
spirit of the antitrust laws, and the Commission had not attacked
this conclusion of the Fifth Circuit before the Supreme Court.
13 7
This check limits the Commission only in that it must be careful
procedurally. The substantive areas that the agency can regulate
remain broad, given its ability to define freely what commercial
acts are illegal. Second, the statement that the Commission can
consider public values beyond those encompassed in the antitrust
laws may be particularly relevant for the occupational licensure
program. At their most basic level, if not always in their specific
application, the policies underlying the antitrust laws arise from
the same presumption in favor of the market that underlies the
criticism of occupational regulation. Thus, the statement that the
Commission can go beyond the policies of the antitrust laws may
justify rules that substitute FTC regulations for those of the states.
Finally, the Court may have given the Commission nearly limitless
discretion in defining "unfairness." S & H may free the Commis-
sion to find "public values" where it will, subject to minimal court
review. Because the Commission has only started to test its powers
135. Id. at 239.
136. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 249-50.
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under S & H, however, it is too early to tell.
Besides the evidence already discussed concerning the free-
dom of the FTC from judicial interference, some additional infor-
mation can be gleaned from two sources. The first is the record of
the Commission in the Supreme Court on substantive cases. Before
1934 the agency won only four of twelve cases. From 1934 until
1958 it won twelve of twenty-one, and since 1958 it has won each
of the seventeen cases before the Court.' 8 Further, of the nine (at
least partial) losses since 1934, four involved the Robinson-Patman
Act, a traditional area of judicial hostility.3 9 None of the other five
held that a practice was within the reach of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, yet still lawful; rather, the Commission lost on
grounds such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
practice was not in interstate commerce, or because another stat-
ute exempted the practice from FTC scrutiny.1
4 0
The second source is the Commission's record in recent years.
Table 2 summarizes the record of the FTC on substantive cases in
the circuit courts of appeals during the first five years of the
1970's. If the court upheld only part of the order, the table lists the
case as a partial victory, even if the part reversed was insignificant.
Table 2141
SUBSTANTIVE FTC CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS: 1970-74
Year Won Partially Won Lost
1970 4 2 1
1971 3 1 2
138. MacIntyre & Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and Incipient Unfairness,
41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 435 (1973); see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233
(1972); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341
(1968); FTC v. University-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Borden Co., 383
U.S. 637 (1966); FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); FTC v.
Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960);
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S.
55 (1959); FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959).
139. MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 138, at 434; see FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355
U.S. 396 (1958); Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470 (1952); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
140. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976), prevented FTC
authority over insurance company advertising.
141. The source for this list of cases is the annual lists found in FTC STATUTES AND
DECISIONS for relevant years (1970-1974).
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1972 3 1 0
1973 5 1 0
1974 3 2 1
Totals 18 7 4
Although a partial defeat in 38 percent of the cases might
seem to indicate a shift from wide judicial deference to more care-
ful scrutiny, a closer look belies that impression. First, the Com-
mission did not lose (even partially) a single case because the court
determined that the practice under question was not an unfair
method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice
within the meaning of the Act. Further, the courts affirmed an im-
portant expansion of Commission authority: the requirement of
advertising substantiation."' Finally, the Seventh Circuit in 1974
upheld the prohibition of a merchandising claim that probably few,
if any, consumers would misunderstand, despite a strong attack by
a dissenting judge and a dissenting commissioner that the problem
was too trivial for FTC concern and that there was no proof of
public injury."3
An analysis of three of the four defeats also reveals a lack of
judicial constraint. Two involved procedural matters: In one, the
Commission lost when it did not follow its own rules and when a
commissioner prejudged the matter;""' in the other, involving a
game of chance, the court held that the Commission's action was
arbitrary because the FTC regulated the practice in some indus-
142. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973) (specific advertising claim held deceptive for lack of substantial scientific
data support). On the importance of advertising substantiation to the FTC, see CLARKSON &
MuRIs, supra note 1, at 234-44.
143. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). In its
advertising circulars, Spiegel offered products on 30 days' "free trial" or at a "percentage
off." These offers were subject to the customer meeting Spiegel's credit qualifications, a
requirement mentioned only in small print and stated in the Spiegel catalogue. Id. at 61-62.
Moreover, Spiegel required the customer to submit credit-related data with the order. The
Commission claimed that the circulars had a capacity to mislead the public because they
allegedly created the impression that the offer was unconditional when actually it depended
on the customer's credit rating. The court majority agreed with the Commission. Id. at 53.
Judge Pell, in a convincing dissent, stated that the Commission had found "a detriment to
the public interest in the situation of deadbeats being deceived into thinking they are going
to receive a free trial of, or discount on, merchandise which they could not realistically
purchase on either a cash or a deferred basis." Id. at 65 (Pell, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
the order form request for credit-related information would certainly inform anyone of rea-
sonable intelligence that Spiegel would send the merchandise only to people with good
credit.
144. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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tries but in this case totally banned it."" The court reversed a
third Commission order because the Commission found a violation
based upon a theory neither in the complaint nor before the hear-
ing examiner. 16 The fourth defeat, in which the court held that
the Commission lacked the power to order restitution, may reveal a
less deferential judicial posture, because the court was unwilling to
endorse the Commission's interpretation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'4 7 This issue is now of diminished importance,
however, because Congress subsequently authorized the Commis-
sion to pursue such a remedy.14 8
Of the seven cases that the Commission lost in part, two in-
volved Commission failure to try the case on the same theory that
the court found underlying the challenged provisions of the or-
der.4 9 Two concerned various sections of the Clayton Act, under
which the courts traditionally do not totally defer to the Commis-
sion in the determination of legality. 50 Two other cases also typify
the deference discussed above. In one, the court overturned an or-
der provision as too broad when the Commission gave almost no
justification for the provision;' 8' in the other, part of the order was
too vague.'5 2 The remaining case, involving the first amendment,
potentially restricts FTC regulation (although not deregulation) of
advertising, but is not directly relevant to any other aspect of the
occupational licensure program.'5
145. Marco Sales Co. v. FTC, 453 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1971).
146. Bendix Corp. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
147. Heather v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
148. Federal Trade Commission (Magnuson-Moss) Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88
Stat. 2183 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
149. Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 412
U.S. 918 (1973); Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865
(1970).
150. Harbor Banana Distrib., Inc. v. FTC, 499 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970). When the FTC brings cases under the
Sherman or Clayton Antitrust Acts, as well as the Robinson-Patman Act, which is techni-
cally an antitrust statute, the courts have not felt themselves bound to defer completely to
the Commission in defining illegality. Instead, the courts hold the Commission to the court-
made principles of antitrust law when bringing its cases under those principles. See CLARK-
SON & MURIS, supra note 1, at 39-41.
151. Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 471 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
152. National Dynamics Corp. v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
993 (1974).
153. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971). As Supreme Court decisions,
e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), have given commercial speech some first
amendment protection, advertisers have argued that the Constitution curtails the FTC.
Thus far, the main constraint has been upon FTC orders, with Balfour the first example.
The extent of the first amendment protection is unclear, however, and in a recent decision
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These cases lead to the conclusion that if the Commission is
careful with its procedures, deciding only issues actually litigated,
and if it does not frame its orders too broadly or arbitrarily, the
courts will generally uphold it.' " Given this historical deference of
the judiciary toward the Commission, congressional impotence to
regulate the FTC's substantive programs, the enthusiasm within
the FTC for regulating the marketplace, and the perverse conse-
quences of some of the agency's efforts,55 the concern caused by
the FTC's assertion of preemptive power becomes easy to under-
stand. The agency has enormous and, it appears, largely uncon-
strained power.
As we shall see in the remainder of this section, however, a
force may be emerging to check the Commission, at least occasion-
ally. The judiciary is shifting away from its traditional deference
toward administrative agencies in general. The next part first con-
siders this shift away from judicial deference towards agencies as a
group, and then discusses some of its specific applications to the
FTC.
B. The New Administrative Law
The traditional view of administrative law reigned supreme
until at least 1960.156 This view focused on limiting an agency to
actions authorized by its statutes and on guaranteeing fairness in
application of its mandate. Underlying this traditional view was a
confidence in the competence of the administrative agency to per-
the Court has retreated from protection of commercial speech. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979). For a more detailed discussion of the constraining power of the fiist amend-
ment on the FTC, see CLARKSON & Mums, supra note 1, at ch. 4, § IV A.
154. We are not asserting that the Commission will always find that the practice of
respondents violates the law. For a variety of reasons, respondents do win in FTC actions.
For example, the staff may be unable to prove the facts as alleged in the complaint, or a
majority of the commissioners, often not members until after approval of the complaint,
may believe that the facts as proven should not constitute a violation. Our point is not that
all companies charged with violating the FTC Act lose, but that the courts have historically
had little influence on the substantive grounds determining victory or defeat.
Moreover, we are not asserting that the FTC's discretion is limitless. For example, the
FTC under the administration of Chairman Pertschuk has discussed moving against prac-
tices of a different nature than those traditionally attacked, including sex discrimination
and the hiring of illegal aliens. See, e.g., ANTImUST & TRADE REG. RmP. (BNA) No. 892, at
A-23 (1978). It seems unlikely that a court would consider that the cases discussed in this
section are dispositive of an FTC attack on such practices.
155. See Peterson, note 40 supra.
156. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1669 (1975), from which this paragraph draws heavily. See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE (1958 & Supps. 1970, 1980).
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form its assigned tasks without extensive court supervision.1 57 The
long-standing freedom of the FTC seems partially attributable to
the lack of extensive judicial review under this traditional ap-
proach. The traditional view is losing much of its force because it
cannot reconcile the resulting enormous power and discretion of
agencies with the concept that intrusions into the rights of private
individuals can be made, if at all, only by the legislature."'5
Courts are now placing more stringent requirements upon
agencies, particularly in their rulemaking activities. Recent opin-
ions have closely scrutinized agency decisions to determine pre-
cisely the empirical data and analytical processes used by the
agencies. 159 Although much of the traditional concern of adminis-
trative law is for fairness, these new cases may also be arguing for
competence. 160
These recent developments on rulemaking may have a sub-
stantial impact on the occupational licensure program. Tradition-
ally, the courts have upheld rules upon finding a plausible hypoth-
esis to support them, with the judges showing extensive deference
to agency expertise."" The court would uphold a rule without a
detailed record or a showing of the precise link made between the
rule and the record."' In contrast, recent cases have required a
detailed record that reveals the relevant facts and reasoning that
led to the decision. Courts have refused to uphold rules when the
facts in the record were inadequate, when the agency failed to re-
spond sufficiently to important comments from parties before it, or
when the agency's statement of the basis and purpose for the rule
was unduly vague or improperly linked to the record.6 8
The decision of the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.'" war-
rants discussion because of its potential impact on the future of
judicial review of agency rulemaking and because the result (if not
all of the specific reasoning) of the lower court's opinion illustrates
157. Stewart, supra note 156, at 1675-76.
158. Id. But see J.O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978) (defending much of the
traditional view).
159. See DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of the Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REV. 257 (1979) (excellent treatment of the "new administrative law").
160. Id.
161. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 204-38 (1976), and the exhaustive treat-
ment of the subject in 4 K. DAVIs, supra note 156, at chs. 29 & 30.
162. See 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 156, at ch. 6 (2d ed. 1978).
163. For a discussion of these and other requirements see id. at chs. 29 & 30.
164. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Blackmun & Powell, JJ., not participating).
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the new judicial attitude. Although Vermont Yankee may seem to
signal the demise, or at least the substantial impairment, of the
increased judicial scrutiny of agency rulemaking proceedings char-
acteristic of the "new administrative law," 16 the decision does not
compel such a broad reading.
In considering the application for an operating license for a
nuclear reactor at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission considered the possible environ-
mental risk from the disposal of radioactive waste. Relying on a
"vague, but glowing" 1" analysis by one of its staff scientists, the
NRC assumed that the risks would be minimal. The scientist's
statement contained a very general and conclusory solution to the
problem, merely offering reassurances that the problem would
eventually be resolved. 1 7 Ruling on a petition for review of the
NRC's proceedings by various public interest groups, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded to .the NRC, with
the majority apparently stressing the inadequacy of the NRC's
procedure. "8 Judge Tamm concurred with the remand, expressing
concern that the NRC may have "uncritically adopted as its own
the undocumented conclusion of a single witness that the waste
storage is a nonproblem." 1"9 He disagreed, however, with what he
felt was the majority's requirement of further, more adversarial
proceedings. Neither opinion allowed the agency to use its alleged
expertise to dismiss objections to its rules. Rather, the court told
the NRC to demonstrate that it had handled the waste disposal
issue competently.
In an opinion extremely critical of the lower court, a unani-
mous Supreme Court reversed.17 0 Although the opinion of the cir-
cuit court is susceptible to different readings, the Supreme Court
interpreted the lower court opinion as holding that the NRC pro-
165. See, e.g., Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345.
166. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
167. Id. at 648-49.
168. Id. at 653-54. Although the majority emphasized procedural inadequacies and, as
discussed below, the concurring opinion of Judge Tamm and the opinion of the Supreme
Court treated the majority opinion as finding inadequate procedures, the majority was un-
willing to rely solely on the need for increased procedures. For example, the majority stated
that "the procedures the agency adopted in this case, if administered in a more sensitive,
deliberate manner, might suffice." 547 F.2d at 653-54.
169. Id. at 658 (Tamm, J., concurring).
170. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Blackmun and Powell, JJ., not participating).
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cedures were inadequate.17 In reversing, the Court concluded that
federal courts may not require federal administrative agencies to
use procedures beyond those specified in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.172 If one reads the opinion of the Supreme Court to allow
agencies to dispose of crucial issues by accepting conclusive, un-
documented statements of their staff, the case would be inconsis-
tent with the trend to narrow the agencies' discretion. Thus the
judicial constraint upon agency action would remain minimal.
Vermont Yankee does not compel this reading, however, as
long as the Court permits review similar to that proposed by Judge
Tamm. The Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee opinion indicates
that it is not tampering with the Tamm 'view. In remanding the
case to determine "whether the challenged rule finds sufficient jus-
tification in the administrative proceedings, ' 173 the Court specifi-
cally noted that Tamm found that it did not. Further, the Court
stated that upon remand the lower court is "entirely free to agree
or disagree '17 4 with Tamm. Thus, the Court may have held only
that the court of appeals could not set aside the rule because of
inadequate procedures. As for the extent of deference to agencies,
the difference between Tamm's reasoning and that of the majority
in the court of appeals (requiring additional proceedings) is
slight. 75 There will be more supervision of agency action than was'
previously customary, whether the courts require more specific
procedures or simply demand a more adequate record. Thus, un-
less the Supreme Court expands Vermont Yankee, the "new ad-
ministrative law" will continue to restrain the substance of agency
action.1
7 6
171. Id. at 549.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 535, 536 n.14.
175. For the agency, however, the Tamm approach may be preferable, leaving to the
agency the decision of what procedures to adopt to make the record "adequate." Because
the agency is presumably in a better position than the court to know what procedures are
best suited for it, Vermont Yankee will be beneficial if read to support the Tamm view.
Although the Tamm view thus has distinct advantages, it also implies that the new adminis-
trative law has limits that a cost-benefit test would partly overcome. See notes 188-213 and
accompanying text infra.
176. Vermont Yankee indicates that the Court rejects that part of the new administra-
tive law requiring procedures beyond the APA. The Court has not faced up to the full impli-
cations of Vermont Yankee, however, since the Tamm position also strays beyond the APA.
See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 521-22 (1979).
Because the Court not only failed to condemn the Tamm view, but seemed to endorse its
general approach, it is unclear how literally one can take the Court's allegiance to the strict
letter of the APA. In any event, as indicated in note 175 supra, judicial imposition of spe-
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. The FTC and the New Administrative Law
What does all of this mean for the FTC in general and for its
occupational licensure program in particular? Although many
precedents support broad agency discretion, including the recent S
& H decision, 17 two facts suggest that the changing judicial atti-
tudes towards the administrative process will affect the Commis-
sion. First, the Commission is no longer involved with trivia, as it
was when the courts decided most of the important cases affecting
the relationship between the FTC and the judiciary. 17 8 Many Com-
mission activities now have enormous potential impact upon con-
sumers and producers. The occupational licensure program, for ex-
ample, would significantly affect the market place in virtually
every state. Second, although it is too early to indicate a trend,
recent FTC cases suggest a change in the judicial attitude toward
the Commission. Following the discussion of these cases, we will
cific procedures is unnecessary and less preferable than the Tamm position.
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), provides ad-
ditional, albeit inconclusive, evidence of the Court's direction regarding rulemaking. Citing
Vermont Yankee, the Court refused to enjoin the New York City Planning Commission and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from constructing low-income
housing. In its short per curiam opinion, the Court found the issue to be whether, under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), the agency needed to elevate environ-
mental over other concerns, to which the Court held that Vermont Yankee provided a nega-
tive answer. The Court continued that "once an agency has made a decision subject to
NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences . . . . " 444 U.S. at 227.
Justice Marshall dissented, finding that the court of appeals had found HUD's actions
arbitrary in addressing the environmental issues, see Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1978), and that the per curiam opinion had retreated from the requirement that the arbi-
trary and capricious standard of judicial review "prescribes a 'searching and careful' judicial
inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreason-
able manner." 444 U.S. at 231. He concluded that the Court had instead substituted the
"essentially mindless" requirement of determining whether HUD had considered environ-
mental factors. Id. Justice Marshall was quoting from one of the leading cases in the devel-
opment of the new administrative law, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971). If he is correct about the retreat from Overton Park-and the Justice
himself did not believe that the Court would adhere to its "mindless" standard in a "differ-
ent factual setting," 444 U.S. at 231-Strycker's Bay would be a significant departure from
the new administrative law. One is not compelled to conclude that the case is in fact such a
retreat, however, given the Court's reading of the circuit court's opinion. The Court found
that the lower court had "elevated" environmental concerns and, perhaps more importantly,
in a footnote in response to the dissent at the end of its opinion, the Court disagreed with
Marshall that the circuit court had found HUD to have acted arbitrarily. 444 U.S. at 231.
Thus, the Court avoided a direct clash with the new administrative law as enunciated in
cases like Overton Park.
177. Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970).
178. For a discussion of FTC focus before 1970 on cases with little or no impact on
consumers, See CLARKSON & MURIS, supra note 1, ch. 1, and sources cited therein.
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consider the application of the "new administrative law" to
rulemaking activities such as those in the occupational licensure
program.
1. RECENT FTC DECISIONS
From 1975 through 1978, the Commission's record in the
courts of appeals included ten victories, ten partial victories, and
one defeat. Four of the decisions indicate that the courts may now
be taking a hard look at what the Commission does, with one even
suggesting that the courts may overrule the Commission on the
definition of legality under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC,17' decided in 1975, was the first of
these decisions. The Commission attacked a scheme to merchan-
dise lingerie and similar items through a pyramid selling system.
Using a mathematical formula, the FTC argued that the number of
people who attempted to sell the goods would quickly reach a level
at which there would no longer be enough customers available for
all sellers. The court found that although the Commission's ab-
stract principle was correct, it had not considered the realities of
the marketplace. 180 More important for our purpose, the court
stated that the courts, not the Commission, should decide what
unfair competition is, a distinct throwback to the era of the
1920's.1"' Although the Commission offered no evidence of harm to
consumers except for its formula, the court's deference to the
Commission was less than that traditionally shown. The court sim-
ply refused to rely upon the Commission's judgment without
stronger factual support.
In the 1977 Chrysler Corporation case,1 82 Chrysler claimed
that tests by Popular Science magazine had shown that Chrysler's
small cars realized greater fuel economy than did the Chevrolet
Nova. The court affirmed the Commission's decision that this
claim was deceptive, but struck out two paragraphs of the order as
overbroad. One paragraph prohibited Chrysler from representing
the results of tests unless the "representation fully and accurately
reflects the test results and unless the tests themselves were so de-
vised and conducted as to completely substantiate each represen-
tation concerning any characteristic tested." 188 The court said that
179. 518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
180. Id. at 38-39.
181. Id. at 38. See generally cases cited note 121 supra.
182. Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
183. Id. at 362 n.2.
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this provision was potentially limitless, and found that another
provision, prohibiting petitioners from "[m]isrepresenting in any
manner. . the purpose, content or conclusion of any test"1" was
limitless. Because the FTC conceded that the violations were unin-
tentional and isolated, confined to only two out of fourteen adver-
tisements, the court found no rational justification for such sweep-
ing provisions. Thus, the court applied its own standard to the
provisions, rather than leaving the establishment of criteria en-
tirely to the Commission's discretion.
The other two cases also note that the violation was uninten-
tional. In both cases, the court struck out part of the FTC orders
as too broad, citing the lack of bad faith on the part of the busi-
ness.185 Further, the decision in Standard Oil Co. of California
questioned the agency's freedom to determine the standard for de-
ception. The Commission had found that advertisements for a gas-
oline additive, F-310, were deceptive because they allegedly im-
plied that the additive would completely reduce pollutants. The
court disagreed, stating that it did "not think that any television
viewer would have a level of credulity so primitive that he could
expect" complete reduction.18e Finding that the record did support
"the Commission's interpretation of the meaning the commercial
would have to the average viewer, ' '1 e8 the court affirmed the
agency's other theories of why the ads were deceptive. Neverthe-
less, an average-viewer standard is harder for the FTC to meet
than a test designed to protect only fools.
2. RULEMAKING
Thus far, only one court has ruled on the substantive merits of
an FTC rule, in Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC.1 88 The Court
184. Id. at 364.
185. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978).
186. 577 F.2d at 657.
187. Id. at 659.
i88. 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979). In American Optometric Ass'n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896
(D.C. Cir. 1980), the court remanded all but one section of the "eyeglass rule," discussed at
notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra, because Supreme Court decisions on commercial
protection of free speech and the reaction to those cases had altered the basis for the rule.
See note 14 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the court did not base the remand on
substantive review of the conditions upon which the FTC relied. For a discussion of the one
section of the rule that the court did affirm, see notes 202-04 and accompanying text infra.
In one important sense, however, substantive review did occur. Despite the redundancy of
FTC laws in light of the first amendment protection, the Commission argued that the states
might still pass laws rendering advertising ineffective by, for example, requiring advertise-
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit found unlawful a rule designed
"to alleviate currently abusive practices against vocational and
home study school students and prospective students."1 89 Although
part of the opinion focused on procedural defects, 190 the court did
indicate that judicial review of substantive provisions of FTC rules
would be more stringent than pre-1975 reviews of FTC matters.
For example, the court struck down a provision requiring
schools to provide the following disclosure form to individuals who
had just signed an enrollment contract, but who, under another
part of the FTC rule, could still cancel the contract without
financial obligation:
Since we made job placement or earnings claims in promoting
this course, we have prepared our record in these areas for your
review. As the Graduation Record pointed out, 50 students grad-
uated from this course - to _. We found that 38 or 76% of
these graduates got jobs in the field of - within 4 months of
their graduation. 191
A school could include no other information concerning job place-
ment in the same material, except for a general statement to the
effect that the placement percentage might be understated. 19' The
school, then, could not disclose such information as how many stu-.
dents did not respond, how many did not seek jobs, or how many
were self-employed.
ments to include affirmative disclosures so burdensome as to deter advertising. The court
refused to support the rule on this basis because the Commission's argument lacked eviden-
tiary support and relied largely on speculation. 626 F.2d at 912-13.
189. 612 F.2d at 661 (quoting from the FTC's statement of Basis and Purpose for the
rule, reprinted at 43 Fed. Reg. 60,795-817).
190. Rather than specifically define the unfair or deceptive acts or practices of the in-
dustry, the Commission simply provided that it was an unfair or deceptive act or practice
not to comply with the rule. The court found that specific definitions were necessary. Id. at
662. As long as courts require the FTC to justify its rule provisions in terms of correcting
specifically identified problems in the industry in question, they can carefully review the
empirical data and analytical process supporting the rule; thus, this requirement of Gibbs
will add little to the constraining power of the judiciary over the FTC.
191. Id. at 664. The rule required this form only if the school had told the prospective
student about the availability of jobs or about the ability of the school's graduates to find
jobs.
192. 16 C.F.R. § 438.3(b) (4) provides:
A school may, at its option, include the following statement on the Disclo-
sure Form in the manner shown in Appendices A-C:
In evaluating our record, remember not all of our students took this course to
get a job in the field of (school to insert area of training). Also we were unable to
reach some of our graduates to see if they got jobs. So, our placement percentage
might be understated.
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The court found the required disclosures misleading and
hence arbitrary and capricious. As the court stated:
Proof in the record shows that adherence to the Commission's
Rule would require one school to show a job placement rate of
5.8%, when in fact the true employment success rate of those
who responded to the school's inquiry was 54 %, or 80 %, if those
who became self-employed were included. Another school would
have to show a placement figure of approximately 67%, al-
though almost 100% of its graduates who sought employment
obtained it.19"
Significantly, a strong dissent, showing great deference to the FTC,
argued that the FTC made a reasonable choice among imperfect
placement statistics.""' But the majority was unwilling to give the
FTC such deference.
Increased judicial scrutiny of agency rulemaking, of which
Katherine Gibbs is an example, has at least one crucial implication
for the occupational licensure program: based on the recent deci-
sions, it will often be easier to deregulate than to regulate.195 This
conclusion follows from the economic case against occupational
regulation, with its powerful theoretical and empirical arguments
that the market generally serves the interests of consumers better
than government regulation. Thus, the Commission will be able to
withstand scrutiny under the recent administrative law decisions if
it chooses to promulgate deregulatory rules with records and de-
tailed reasoning.
On the other hand, when the Commission decides that the
market produces results that it does not like, such a rule may not
be as easy to justify. Because many of these rules will impose costs,
opponents may force the Commission either to rebut evidence that
the costs exist or to justify their imposition. Particularly when the
issue is the economic welfare of consumers, the FTC will often
have to overcome theoretical and empirical evidence that its regu-
lation is unwarranted.
Consider the following three FTC rules as examples of possi-
ble court review of FTC rulemaking. In the first, the agency
193. 612 F.2d at 665.
194. Id. at 680 (Newman, J., dissenting). The dissent also would have interpreted the
FTC provision to allow schools to disclose in the same package as the required form other
truthful data that would be necessary to prevent information from being misleading. Id. at
681. In addition to the placement provision, the majority also struck down the FTC provi-
sion on tuition refunds for students who did not finish the course. Id. at 664. Again the
majority showed less than traditional deference to the agency, particularly in contrast to the
dissent, which would have upheld the FTC on this issue. Id. at 679.
195. Again, we assume that the courts will permit FTC preemption.
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preempts state laws that prohibit advertising of ophthalmic goods
and services 1 "6 and bases this deregulatory rule on strong theoreti-
cal and empirical support, including refutation of the arguments
favorable to advertising bans.1 ' At the other extreme is the Com-
mission's rule on creditors' remedies that will rewrite credit con-
tracts.198 The rulemaking proceedings have included substantial
economic testimony, both from FTC and from industry witnesses,
that the costs of modifying or eliminating creditors' remedies are
substantial relative to the possible benefits.199 Thus, an FTC justi-
fication of this rule as benefiting consumers, particularly poor con-
sumers who will bear the heaviest costs, will be difficult to sustain
under recent, more stringent judicial review. 00
A third rule presenting an interim case-in that the major
problem is its justification, not necessarily its impact-involves
that part of the eyeglasses rule designed to separate dispensing
and examination.201 As explained in Section IV,202 the Commis-
sion's justification for the provision-that the removal of the ad-
vertising laws will have little impact without separation of dispens-
ing from examination-is questionable, given lower prices in states
with advertising but without separation of examination and dis-
pensing. If opponents had developed this point in the rulemaking
proceeding, the Commission could ignore it only at its peril in the
event of court review.
203
196. 16 C.F.R. § 456 (1980).
197. See Benham, supra note 3.
198. See Peterson, supra note 40.
199. Id.
200. By applying different standards to the evidence of costs than to the evidence of
benefits, the FTC's presiding officer for the creditors' remedy rulemaking has reached a
different conclusion than the one in the text. See Peterson, supra note 40. It remains to be
seen, however, whether an appellate court will allow such manipulation to support the
agency position. If the Commission adopts the presiding officer's conclusion and reasoning
and if a court then affirms the FTC, then this would imply that the courts will continue to
be a minimal constraint upon the agency.
201. See 43 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 24,007-08 (1978).
202. See notes 36-52 and accompanying text supra.
203. The Commission's statement of basis and purpose and the staff report of the Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection do not appear to analyze this point. A theoretical case exists to
show that this proposal will have costs, although the Commission's statements on the rule
do not discuss this possibility. If opponents of the regulation had seriously argued, using
well-developed theoretical and empirical analysis, that the rule's impact would be to raise
costs, the agency would only ignore these facts at its peril. In American Optometric Ass'n v.
FTC, 626 F.2d 896, the court affirmed the separation requirement. According to the court,
however, the provision was challenged as harming consumers because opticians could not
adequately fit contact lenses, not because of lack of evidence supporting its necessity to
allow advertising to function effectively. Based on evidence in the record, the Commission
1980]
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This is not to say that the courts will force the FTC to con-
form strictly to economic analysis in its rulemaking process. With-
out such an analysis, however, the agency may have very broad
discretion. When the Commission attempts to justify the rules
under an economic analysis, therefore, the judiciary is likely to be
a more effective constraint than when the agency uses a less rigor-
ous premise. If, as S & H implies, the Commission can promulgate
rules on the basis of vague policies and leave their appropriate ap-
plication largely to FTC discretion, the agency will often avoid
close judicial scrutiny.
For example, let us again consider the provision of the eye-
glasses rule separating dispensing from examination. The Commis-
sion attempts to justify this provision as necessary to allow adver-
tising to function, a proposition susceptible to close empirical
scrutiny.0 4 On the other hand, the Commission might have sought
to justify the rule on the basis of the "freedom" of opticians to
practice as independent businessmen. If the courts allow the Com-
mission to pursue such policies, what standards apply? What evi-
dence is relevant? What of the examiners' rights? What if the con-
sumer's right to a prescription raises prices? Once the Commission
moves beyond economic analysis, the decisional basis may involve
only a nebulous, ad hoc balancing.2 05 The less rigorous the justifi-
cation that the FTC must give for a rule, the less effective the judi-
cial review, thereby reducing the constraining power of the courts.
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Given that even recent judicial decisions may allow the Com-
mission to promulgate regulations harmful to consumers, the ques-
tion arises whether the courts can devise a more effective judicial
constraint, assuming that the FTC's rulemaking authority contin-
ues. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently applied a
cost-benefit approach to decisions of certain agencies.20 6 For exam-
ple, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) promul-
had properly addressed this concern for quality.
204. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
205. Economic analysis does not ignore the claims discussed in the text. A freely oper-
ating market would allow individuals to have these "rights" if they desire to pay for them.
Underlying our argument for effective judicial scrutiny is the assumption that if someone
must make the political choice to impose costs upon consumers without compensating bene-
fits, Congress should make such a choice, not an administrative agency.
206. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
440 U.S. 906 (1979); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d
831 (5th Cir. 1978).
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gated a "Safety Standard for Swimming Pool Slides," requiring
manufacturers to include warning signs on new slides, limiting in-
stallation of large slides to water more than four feet deep, and,
because of the danger of drowning in the deeper water, mandating
a ladder-chain device to warn children to stay off slides. The court
held that the CPSC must carefully examine, not only the nature
and severity of the risk, but also the potential the standard has for
reducing the severity or frequency of the injury and the effect the
standard would have on the utility, cost, or availability of the
product.2 0 7 Given the infrequency of the risk involved, the Com-
mission had to produce evidence that the standard actually prom-
ised to reduce the risk. Further, the CPSC did not know whether
the required signs would be so explicit and shocking in portraying
the risk of paralysis as to deter unnecessarily the marketing of
slides.208 Judge Wisdom, in concurrence, aptly summarized the
court's opinion on this point:
[T]he balance the Commission draws between the benefits and
the costs must have support .... The benefits from these signs
have no reasonable relationship to the costs they will impose.
With no evidence on the cost side of the ledger, the Commis-
sion's cost-benefit analysis is without substantial evidence for
support.
20°
This case relied upon the applicable agency statute, and it is
not at all clear that the court will similarly interpret the FTC
Act.110 Accordingly, legislation may be necessary to guarantee cost-
benefit review. The advantage of this approach to the FTC is that
it would focus rulemaking on consumer welfare.2 1 1 Because the
Commission acts to protect the consumer,212 cost-benefit analysis is
the ideal tool to determine whether a rule will in fact serve that
207. 569 F.2d at 844.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 845 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
210. This case turned upon the interpretation of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2056(a), 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976), which authorized the CPSC to promulgate safety
standards "reasonably necessary" to eliminate or reduce an "unreasonable risk" of injury.
The court required the agency to weigh costs against the benefits to determine whether the
standard was reasonably necessary. 569 F.2d at 840. It remains to be seen whether the
courts will apply similar requirements to FTC rules meant to carry out the Federal Trade
Commission Act's mandate to prevent "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices."
211. Although one might reasonably interpret the FTC Act to require something ap-
proaching the cost-benefit standard, one might also reasonably interpret it to allow the
Commission to ignore these considerations. See DeLong, supra note 158, at 282 n.133.
212. See id. at 322-28.
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end. Consumers are unlikely to welcome a "protector" who raises
costs without producing compensating benefits.
Of course, objections to cost-benefit analysis will arise. Most
prominent among them is that one cannot appropriately measure
benefits and costs. For various reasons this objection should not
bar the proposed reform. First, there is reason to be skeptical
about statements -that the relevant costs and benefits are not
measurable:
If there is a demand for information, the cry goes out that what
the organization does cannot be measured .... Often times this
is another way of saying, "Mind your own business." Sometimes
the line taken is that the work is so subtle that it resists any
tests. On other occasions the point is made that only those
schooled in esoteric arts can properly understand what the or-
ganization does and they can barely communicate to the uniniti-
ated. There are men so convinced of the ultimate righteousness
of their cause that they cannot imagine why anyone would wish
to know how well they are doing in handling our common diffi-
culties. Their activities are literally priceless; vulgar notions of
cost and benefits do not apply to them.2 "
Second, under this approach the FTC would not misdirect its
attention to noneconomic criteria (such as distributional effects)
that would complicate cost-benefit analysis. The focus would be
only on the economic welfare of consumers as a group. Third, the
FTC would rarely be involved in resolving great scientific contro-
versies that complicate cost-benefit analysis in subjects such as nu-
clear power. Fourth, the FTC would not always need to show with
certainty that benefits exceed costs. FTC rules should receive ap-
proval with an automatic five-year sunset provision when the
FTC's evidence failed to prove that the benefits would exceed the
costs, but the evidence did show that sufficient benefits were likely
but could not be demonstrated at the time of the proceeding. If at
the end of the five years, the agency could not show that benefits
exceeded costs, the rule would lapse. This procedure would allow
the agency to collect "before and after" data to demonstrate the
net benefits of its action.
The cost-benefit standard alone would not guarantee an end
to anti-consumer regulation. The Commission would still have
broad discretion in some cases, particularly when evidence is in se-
213. Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND
POLICY ANALYSIS 461 (R. Haveman & J. Margolis, eds. 1970).
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rious conflict. Requiring the FTC to show that its cases produce
benefits exceeding costs would at the very least, however, limit
FTC discretion to impose costly regulation upon consumers with-
out compensating benefits. Such a requirement would be an impor-
tant step toward transforming the agency from one not subject to
meaningful court review into one based on the appropriate rule of
law: the welfare of consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the FTC's occupational licensure program,
based on presumed power to preempt state laws, appears to en-
courage curtailment of state regulation of occupations. Closer anal-
ysis, however, casts considerable doubt upon such a conclusion.
The source of this doubt lies within the agency, rather than with-
out. Within, the FTC in many cases is likely to resolve its schizo-
phrenic attitude toward the market in favor of regulation, not de-
regulation. We do not conclude that the agency will never pursue
deregulatory cases and rules, but it would not be at all surprising if
-most FTC activities preempting state laws were usually regulatory
in nature, not deregulatory. Even for advertising, on which the
FTC's position has been consistently deregulatory, the FTC's pre-
emption power is now of questionable utility. Although when the
occupational licensure program began with attacks on state bans of
advertising it promised to be enormously beneficial to consumers,
the Supreme Court's protection of commercial speech has reduced
the necessity for FTC intervention.2 14
Outside the agency, the picture is somewhat different. Not-
withstanding the growing congressional opposition to the FTC's
foray against occupational regulation, such opposition is unlikely
to cause a curtailment of either the regulatory or the deregulatory
aspects of the program unless it gains more political power than it
now possesses. Otherwise, Congress can force the agency only to
appear before it, explain its actions, and even investigate certain
industries. But Congress has limited ability to require or stop spe-
cific FTC law enforcement. As for the courts, even if they conclude
that the Commission can preempt, they are unlikely to oppose a
deregulatory occupational licensure program and are more likely to
214. After Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the unconstitutionality of laws
against advertising of opthalmic goods and services seems clear. Indeed, in a recent case in
which a federal district court found such laws to be unconstitutional, those supporting the
law did not even appeal that part of the opinion. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1978).
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constrain new regulation than are the other two institutions that
we have studied. Without a cost-benefit review, however, even the
courts may all too often be only a limited constraint upon the ten-
dency of the Commission to promulgate regulatory rules that re-
duce the well-being of consumers.
